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FROM CRANE TO TUFTS: IN SEARCH OF A




In 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the
case of Crane v. Commissioner.1 This case has been credited with
laying down two major principles of tax law: (1) The face amount of
nonrecourse liability shall be included in basis for purposes of depre-
ciation deductions;, and (2) any outstanding balance on the nonre-
course liability shall be treated as an amount realized upon disposi-
tion of the property.3
For a long while, Crane was accepted as an absolute statement
of the law with respect to the two principles it embodied. In Mayer-
son v. Commissioner,' for example, the face amount of a purchase
money nonrecourse liability5 was included in the property's basis for
depreciation purposes, though the liability was not to be paid for
Copyright 0 1982 by Patricia A. Cain.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. B.A., 1968, Vassar College; J.D.,
1973, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2. See id. at 11. Although the exact issue before the Court involved the computation of
gain upon disposition of the mortgaged property, id. at 2, and not the validity of prior depreci-
ation deductions, the Court had to consider the basis/depreciation issue in order to compute
adjusted basis, which is a necessary element in the computation of gain. Gain equals "amount
realized" upon disposition less "adjusted basis." I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1976).
3. 331 U.S. at 13.
4. 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv.
5. The nonrecourse liability in Crane was attached to inherited property and, thus, did
not represent a purchase money obligation of Mrs. Crane.
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ninety-nine years.6 Crane was believed to require such a result.'
More recent decisions, however, have established meaningful
exceptions to the rule embodied in Crane's principle number one.
Thus, for example, if the nonrecourse liability represents a contin-
gent, nonascertainable amount, it may be improper to include it in
basis. 8 Additionally, if the fair market value of the property secured
by the nonrecourse mortgage is less than the promised purchase
price, inclusion of the liability in the property's basis for depreciation
purposes might not be warranted.9
6. 47 T.C. at 352.
7. Id. at 351; see also Blackstone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801, 804
(1949), acq. 1949-2 C.B. 1; Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 458 (1st Cir. 1950). The Tax
Court in Mayerson correctly analyzed Crane as holding that the absence of personal liability
on a mortgage indebtedness was not alone sufficient to preclude inclusion of the debt in depre-
ciable basis. The Tax Court considered whether the agreement as a whole, including the 99
year repayment provision, created a real obligation to pay the purchase price reflected in the
face amount of the nonrecourse note. In holding for the taxpayer, the court said: "[Aifter
viewing the totality of the circumstances and all the evidence of record we have found and
hold that a valid debt obligation was created by the purchase-money mortgage in question." 47
T.C. at 352.
8. See, e.g., Gibson Prods. Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aftd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1981); Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367 (1969), aft'd per
curlam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971); Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773, 779 (1957)
(Forrester, J., concurring).
Note that although these cases involve "valid debt obligation[s]," Mayerson, 47 T.C. at
352, the amount of the liability is unknown. Presumably, where the amount of liability is
unknown, to give advance credit by including the liability in basis would create accounting
problems beyond the capability of our present tax system. Just as an accrual basis taxpayer is
not allowed to take a current deduction for accrued liabilities until "the amount thereof can be
determined with reasonable accuracy," Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (1957), no taxpayer
should be given an advance credit in the form of a basis increase for liabilities to be paid in the
future which are similarly uncertain in amount. The Mayerson court held, however, that the
face amount of the liability was properly included in basis even though that amount might be
reduced in the future if certain contingencies were met. See 47 T.C. at 352.
It is unclear whether this exception for liabilities contingent in amount should be consid-
ered a special exception for the inclusion of nonrecourse liabilities in basis or whether it ex-
tends to taxpayers who assume personal liability for contingent liabilities as well. See Albany
Car Wheel Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 831 (1963), affdper curiam, 333 F.2d 653 (2d
Cir. 1964). The Albany Car Wheel court first reasoned that the contingent character of the
liabilities, although they had been personally assumed by the taxpayer, precluded them from
being included in basis, and then subsequently stated that the taxpayer had not really assumed
the liabilities. Id. at 839-41. For a further discussion of this issue, see Halpern, Liabilities and
Cost Basis: Some Fundamental Considerations, 7 J. REAL Est. TAX'N 334 (1980); Landis,
Liabilities and Purchase Price, 27 TAx LAw. 67 (1973).
9. See Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (nonrecourse
debt due in 10 years exceeded value of purchased real estate); Siegel v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
659 (1982); Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982) (nonrecourse notes for purchase of
movie films exceeded films' value); Rev. Rul. 79-432, 1979-2 C.B. 289 (art print tax shelter in
which nonrecourse debt exceeded value of depreciable master plate). For a discussion of recent
[Vol. I 1:1
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With regard to Crane's second principle, the inclusion of nonre-
course debt in amount realized, the courts have been less amenable
to creating exceptions. Taxpayers have tried to distinguish Crane on
its facts to avoid the recognition of gain that results from a strict
application of principle number two. For example, some have ar-
gued, without success, that abandoning the mortgaged property or
deeding it to creditors is not a Crane-type disposition. 0 Others have
argued that if the liability exceeds the property's fair market value
at the time of disposition, the Crane rule of full inclusion in amount
realized does not apply."" Indeed, in Crane's famous footnote 37,12
the Court suggested that principle number two might be limited to
cases in which the mortgaged property has a value at the time of
disposition at least equal to the face amount of the mortgage.' 3
Many commentators have emphasized, however, that the footnote is
merely dictum."4 In addition, although taxpayers continue to rely op-
timistically on its continued viability, most courts have agreed with
the commentators, holding that the footnote is not only dictum, but
that it is bad dictum, and thus has no legal status.' 5
In the case of Tufts v. Commissioner,'6 however, the Fifth Cir-
cuit has taken a different approach. The court reviewed the Crane
decision in close detail and reached a conclusion that breathes new
cases involving this exception, see Gans, Re-examining The Sham Doctrine: When Should an
Overpayment Be Reflected in Basis?, 30 BUFFALO L. REv. 95 (1981).
10. See Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950)(taxpayer's characterization of
transaction as abandonment of property to mortgagee banks did not prevent it from being
disposition upon which gain was realized).
11. For examples of negative judicial response to this argument, see Millar v. Commis-
sioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Parker v. Delaney, 186
F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950)(court found value equal to debt); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 15, 28 (1979); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 769-70 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d
1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
12. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
13. In footnote 37, the Court stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a
mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mort-
gage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving
boot. That is not this case.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Halpern, Footnote 37 and the Crane Case: The Problem That Never
Really Was, 6 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 197, 221-22 (1979); Rollyson, Recent Cases and Rulings,
3 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 495 (1976) (supporting conclusion of Service in Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-
1 C.B. 214, which gives no effect to footnote 37).
15. See cases cited supra note 11.
16. 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
1982]
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life into footnote 37.
The taxpayers in Tufts had secured $1.8 million in nonrecourse
financing for the purpose of constructing an apartment complex.17
After claiming significant depreciation deductions in excess of their
cash investment,"' they transferred their interest in the complex to a
third party. 19 Under the second principle of Crane, the disposition
should have triggered a gain of approximately $400,000.20 Relying
on footnote 37, however, the taxpayers argued that the amount real-
ized should not include the full $1.8 million of outstanding debt be-
cause the property's value had declined to $1.4 million. 1 In holding
for the taxpayers on this point, the Fifth Circuit stated: "Because
* * . we have serious reservations about the Crane decision, we de-
cline to extend it beyond the facts of that case, and we therefore
conclude that the fair market value limitation so '[o]bviously' antici-
pated by footnote 37 is warranted. 22
The Tufts decision thus created a classic conflict between the
circuits.23 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit's express reservations
about the Crane decision and desire to limit Crane to its facts,24 have
given taxpayers a sufficiently reasonable basis for taking aggressive
tax return positions upon the disposition or abandonment of failing
tax shelters.2 5 The Treasury long has been concerned that taxpayers
17. Id. at 1059. In point of fact, the taxpayers in Tufts were limited partners and the
nonrecourse financing was made available to the partnership. For purposes of discussion in this
article, however, the partnership will be ignored since it is a nontaxable entity.
18. Under the first principle of Crane, depreciable basis included the nonrecourse debt
on which no payments were made. At the time of the transfer, therefore, the debt exceeded the
property's adjusted basis by over $300,000.
19. 651 F.2d at 1059. The individuals actually transferred their partnership interests.
Such a transfer in this case produces the same tax results that an outright transfer of the
building would have produced. For purposes of simplicity, I am ignoring the partnership as-
pects of this case as I believe the issues are the same, whether the building was held in a
partnership or by the taxpayers individually. See supra note 17.
20. See 651 F.2d at 1059.
21. See Id.
22. Id. at 1063.
23. The Third Circuit's opinion in Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), is in direct conflict, as is the Tax Court's opinion in Estate of
Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
24. 651 F.2d at 1063.
25. According to ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opin-
ion 314 (1965), reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671 (1965), if there is a reasonable basis for taking a
particular position on a tax return, there is no need to disclose what that basis is, or that it
might be questionable. For a discussion of the problems that this "reasonable basis" approach
presents to the tax collector, see Kurtz, Remarks to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 103 DAILY TAX REPORT J-3, May 26, 1977, reprinted in B. WOLFMAN & J.
HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TA PRAcTcE 36-39 (1981).
[Vol. 11:l1
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who rely on Crane to include nonrecourse debt in basis in order to
claim high depreciation deductions, will not include the outstanding
balance in the amount realized upon disposition, on the theory that
they fall within the exception of footnote 37.26 Tufts significantly
inceases this concern.
On May 3, 1982, the Supreme Court granted the Government's
petition for certiorari in Tufts.17 Thus, for the first time since 1947,
the Court will address the issue of nonrecourse debt and its role in
tax shelter financing. At long last, the speculation regarding Crane's
footnote 37 may be laid to rest.
The present Supreme Court can approach the Tufts case in a
number of different ways. For example, it could review the 1947 de-
cision in Crane and conclude that the two principles adopted in that
decision are applicable to the taxpayers in Tufts and dismiss foot-
note 37 as meaningless dictum. In my opinion, this approach would
require both a reexamination of the underlying rationale in Crane
and an explanation of why footnote 37 is irrelevant to that rationale.
On the other hand, the Court might determine that Crane's two
principles are valid, but that the appropriate rationale is something
other than the explanation offered by the Crane Court. This ap-
proach would allow the Court to adopt its own rationale and explain
why the property's fair market value at the time of disposition is
irrelevant. Finally, the Court might analyze the Crane Court's con-
cern with fair market value and conclude that footnote 37 implicitly
states a valid legal proposition which is consistent with the rationale
in Crane and which ought to be given effect. The effect, however,
should not be the effect endorsed by the Fifth Circuit, i.e., total for-
giveness of the tax upon final disposition.
The Fifth Circuit arguably concluded that since footnote 37
correctly limits "amount realized" to the property's fair market
value at the time of disposition, it necessarily follows that gain at the
time of disposition must, likewise, be limited. This latter limitation,
however, is not a logical corollary to the former. There is no lan-
guage in footnote 37 which requires that any gain attributable to
26. For a suggestion of the potential widespread use of footnote 37 in tax shelter
schemes, see Ginsburg, The Leaky Tax Shelter, 53 TAxEs 719, 730 (1975). The Treasury's
concern actually goes beyond potential taxpayer reliance on footnote 37. Even if the property
has not declined in value, many taxpayers fail to report income upon the disposition of a tax
shelter investment. Since many such dispositions do not involve any payment of cash to the
transferor, the existence of a taxable event is more likely to escape notice. See The President's
1978 Tax Program, Department of the Treasury, at 65 (Jan. 30, 1978).
27. 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
1982]
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the amount of the debt in excess of the property's value should for-
ever go untaxed.28
Opponents of footnote 37 have advanced a number of theories
which accurately explain why this excess of debt over value does
constitute taxable gain. To the extent these opponents conclude,
however, that taxable gain ought to be computed under section 1001
by including the entire debt in the amount realized, thereby treating
the entire gain as a disposition of property gain, their reasoning suf-
fers from the same logical defect as that of the Fifth Circuit.
It is my opinion that footnote 37 should be read as correctly
limiting the amount realized to the property's fair market value at
the time of disposition. Whereas it is true that such a limitation will
reduce the section 1001 gain in a case such as Tufts, my reading of
footnote 37 would also allow the Court to find additional gain which
is attributable to the excess debt. I believe it is important to identify
this additional gain as one which results from something other than
receiving an amount realized upon disposition of the property.
The purpose of this article is to support my interpretation of
footnote 37 as one which is consistent with the reasoning in Crane
and as one which deserves implementation as a matter of tax policy.
This article will demonstrate that the reasoning in Crane suggests
that "amount realized" is a statutorily defined term'which serves
only to identify the true sales price of the transferred property, irre-
spective of the amount of debt outstanding. This view of the Court's
reasoning is supported by its apparent focus on the total considera-
tion for the transfer at the time of disposition. 9
This article also demonstrates that limiting the amount realized
to the property's fair market value at the time of disposition is a
theoretically sound approach because it serves to produce overall tax
consequences consistent with fundamental tax principles. Specifi-
cally, this approach denies potential capital gains characterization to
any economic benefit derived from the property which is unrelated to
28. For the text of footnote 37, see supra note 13. The footnote states that if the mort-
gage exceeds the value, the mortgagor cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. 331 U.S.
at 14 n.37. The Court's attention, however, was focused on the benefit at the time of disposi-
tion. Thus, this language should be interpreted as meaning that the mortgagor cannot realize a
benefit equal to the mortgage at the time of disposition. It is the "time of disposition" benefit
that the Court is characterizing as the amount realized. Prior benefits may produce current
income taxable under some theory other than one which identifies it as an amount realized
under § 1001, I.R.C. § 1001 (1976). See infra text accompanying notes 247-96.
29. See I.R.C. § 1001(b) (amount realized is amount of money received plus fair market
value of any property received).
[Vol. 1! i1
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the sale or exchange of the property. In Tufts, this approach would
result in excluding the entire nonrecourse debt from the amount re-
alized, thereby taxing the gain attributable to the amount of debt in
excess of basis as ordinary income.
The article's focus, however, is beyond Crane and Tufts. Its
principle objective is to identify a workable rationale for nonrecourse
debt transactions which can explain the result in Crane, support the
desired result in Tufts, and provide predictability for fact situations
between and beyond these two cases.
In pursuing this objective, the article begins with a detailed
analysis of Crane, particularly its facts. My purpose is to highlight a
number of factual considerations and related legal issues that were
totally omitted from the Supreme Court's final opinion in the case.30
Indeed, the detailed analysis will be more than mere review. It will
provide new information which should both be of interest academi-
cally and also provide some insight as to the Crane Court's reasoning
process.
The next section of the article will focus on three different ratio-
nales previously discussed in the Crane literature: (1) the Economic
Benefit Rationale,31 (2) the Tax Benefit Rationale,32 and (3) the
Double Deduction Rationale.3 In point of fact, the three rationales
are not necessarily as distinct as their separate nomenclature might
suggest. 4 Although each can be used to identify the correct total
gain upon the disposition of property subject to nonrecourse debt, I
submit that none of them answers the question of how the resulting
gain ought to be characterized for tax purposes. Thus, Part III of
this article concludes with a discussion of what effect the property's
decline in value ought to have on characterization of gain.
Part IV of the article focuses on an additional rationale that
ought to be considered in nonrecourse mortgage transactions, the
Uniform Treatment Rationale. I suggest that this is the rationale
implicitly adopted in Crane to support principle number one. With
30. Many facts were omitted from the Supreme Court opinion. For example, the Court
failed to mention that Mrs. Crane's depreciation deductions yielded her virtually no tax bene-
fit. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 179-95 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
34. The separately identified rationales have not been developed in the Crane literature
in a manner consistent with my own explanation of each rationale. For purposes of the analysis
in this article, however, each rationale will be discussed separately and potential differences
between them will be suggested.
19821
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respect to principle number two, the Uniform Treatment Rationale
is offered as an analytical tool for answering the question left open
by the other three rationales, i.e., how should the resulting gain, es-
pecially in footnote 37 cases, be characterized?
As indicated earlier, my ultimate thesis is that the total gain in
a case such as Tufts is not one that is derived from a sale or ex-
change of property. To the extent it is not, the potential for favorable
capital gains treatment ought to be eliminated. I further suggest in
Part IV's discussion of the Uniform Treatment Rationale that in ap-
propriate cases the nondisposition-of-property gain might be charac-
terized as discharge of indebtedness income. This characterization
raises the issue of whether the nonrecourse mortgagor can claim re-
lief under section 108. 35
II. THE Crane CASE
A. The Facts
1. An Overview.-In 1932, Beulah Crane inherited an apart-
ment building from her husband. 6 At the time of Mr. Crane's
death, the property was subject to an outstanding mortgage in the
amount of $262,042.50 which included principal of $255,000 and ac-
crued unpaid interest of $7,042.50. s7 The property was appraised in
the decedent's estate tax return at a value which exactly equalled the
outstanding mortgage plus accrued interest.3 8 Thus, Mrs. Crane
claimed a depreciable basis in the property under the forerunner to
section 1014 of $262,042.50.39
35. I.R.C. § 108 (Supp. IV 1980) (allowing certain taxpayers to defer recognition of
gain which results from discharge of debt). See infra notes 264-65. The issue of whether § 108
relief is available cannot be resolved in the Tufts case as it is not an issue which is properly
before the Court.
The only issue before the Court is whether the face amount of the outstanding nonre-
course liability is properly included in "amount realized." Even if the availability of § 108
relief were an issue before the Court, it is unlikely that the taxpayers in Tufts would qualify.
See Infra text accompanying notes 282-96. It should also be pointed out that the taxable years
involved in the Tufts case predate the 1980 amendments to § 108. Thus, even if the issue were
before the Court, it would have to be resolved on the basis of prior law. See infra notes 263-64.
36. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 4. It should be emphasized that under § 1014, basis is equal to the fair market
value of the inherited property at the date of death. I.R.C. § 1014 (1976). If the inherited
property is viewed as the physical asset itself, then any liens attached to the property should be
considered irrelevant for the purpose of basis. That is, the existence of the lien neither in-
creases nor decreases the basis otherwise determined under § 1014. But see infra note 77.
[Vol. 11: 1
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For the years 1932 through 1936, the property was held by the
decedent's estate. Income and deductions were accounted for in the
estate's income tax returns.40 Subsequently, the property was distrib-
uted to Mrs. Crane as beneficiary and, accordingly, she accounted
for the relevant income and deductions in her individual tax returns
for 1937 and 1938.41 During this period, no payments were made to
reduce the outstanding debt.42
In 1938, Mrs. Crane sold the apartment building, subject to a
then outstanding mortgage indebtedness of $270,857.7 1.4 The build-
ing was sold to an unrelated purchaser for $2,500 cash, net of selling
expenses.4 Mrs. Crane reported a $2,500 gain on the sale and char-
acterized it as a long term capital gain.45
The Commissioner asserted a deficiency, claiming that Mrs.
Crane recognized an ordinary gain of $24,031.45 on the sale of the
building and a capital loss on the sale of the land of $528.85.46 The
40. Record at 6-7.
41. Id.
42. Only partial payment of current interest was made. Id. at 25-26. By 1938, the debt
together with accrued interest amounted to $270,857.71. See 331 U.S. at 3.
43. The increase of $8,815.21 represents an additional accumulation of unpaid interest
attributable to the years 1932 to 1938. See supra text accompanying note 37.
44. 331 U.S. at 3.
45. See id. at 4.
46. Id. at 5. The Commissioner determined these figures as follows:
1. Of the original § 1014 basis, $207,042.50 was allocated to the building and $55,000 to
the land. Id. at 4.
2. Allowable depreciation at two percent per annum totalled $24,845.10 for the years
1932 through 1937 (2% x 6 years x $207,042.50). Mrs. Crane claimed and was "allowed"
$3,200 depreciation for 1938. Thus, the total of allowable and allowed depreciation was
$28,045.10. Id. at 4 & n.5.
3. The building's basis must be reduced by this total amount even though depreciation
actually claimed by Mrs. Crane totalled only $25,200, and even though most of the deductions
produced no tax benefit. Id. at 3 n.2; see id. at 4.
4. The amount realized upon disposition included the $2,500 cash plus the amount of
principal outstanding on the mortgage as of Mr. Crane's death, $255,000, for a total of
$257,500. Id. at 3. The Commissioner eliminated the accrued interest as of Mr. Crane's death
from the amount realized on the theory that interest is a deductible item. Id. at 4 n.6. This
theory is correct only if the accrued interest would have been deductible by Mrs. Crane. Since
the interest had accrued during Mr. Crane's lifetime, however, it should be viewed as his
interest and, thus, not deductible by Mrs. Crane. See Rev. Rul. 58-129, 1958-1 C.B. 93.
5. Allocating the total amount realized according to relative fair market values produced
an amount realized on the land of $54,471.15 and an amount realized on the building of
$203,028.85.
6. Loss on the land was thus $528.85 ($54,471.15 realized less $55,000 basis) and gain on
the building was $24,031.45 ($203,028.85 realized less $178,997.40 adjusted basis).
7. Since the building was a business asset subject to depreciation, it was not a capital
asset. Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, § 117(a)(l), 52 Stat. 447 (now codified at I.R.C. §
19821
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Supreme Court agreed with the Commissioner's characterization of
the transaction, 47 specifically holding that:
(1) Mrs. Crane's original basis in the property was its fair mar-
ket value at Mr. Crane's death, $262,042.50, undiminished by the
outstanding mortgage liability;48 (2) that basis must be adjusted
downward by the amount of depreciation allowable, i.e.,
$28,045. 10;49 (3) the amount realized upon disposition included both
the cash received ($2,500) and the outstanding principal on the
mortgage liability ($255,000), despite Mrs. Crane's lack of personal
liability on the debt.50
Thus, Mrs. Crane was required to pay taxes on a net gain of
1221(2)(1976)). Thus, gain on the building was ordinary gain. (Note that in 1938 there was
no provision in the tax law comparable to current I.R.C. § 1231 which would have allowed
capital gain on the sale of this type of asset).
47. Crane, 331 U.S. at 4-5.
48. Id. at 11. The Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, § 113(a)(5), 52 Stat. 447 (current
version at I.R.C. § 1014(a), (b)(1976)), provided:
(a) BASIS (UNADJUSTED) OF PROPERTY.-The basis of property shall be the
cost of such property; except that. . . (5) PROPERTY TRANSMITTED AT DFATH.-If
the property was acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, . . . the basis shall be
the fair market value of such property at the time of such acquisition.
49. See 331 U.S. at 4, 11. The Revenue Act of 1938, c. 289, 52 Stat. 447, provided:
(b) ADJUSTED BAss.-The adjusted basis for determining the gain or loss from
the sale or other disposition of property, whenever acquired, shall be the basis deter-
mined under subsection (a), adjusted as hereinafter provided.
(I) GENERAL RULE.-Proper adjustment in respect of the property shall in all
cases be made-
(B) in respect of any period since February 28, 1913, for exhaustion,
wear and tear. . . to the extent allowed (but not less than the amount allow-
able) under this Act ....
Id. § 113(b)(current version at I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1016(a)(2) (1976)).
Also applicable was the following provision:
(a) BASIS FOR DEPRECIATION.-The basis upon which exhaustion, wear and tear
.. . are to be allowed in respect of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided
in section 113(b) for the purpose of determining the gain upon the sale or other
disposition of such property.
Id. § 114(a).
50. See 331 U.S. at 4, 14. The applicable provision under the Revenue Act of 1938, c.
289, § 111(b), 52 Stat. 447 (current version at I.R.C. § 1001(b)(1976)), defined "amount
realized" as follows:
(b) AMOUNT REALIZED.-The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the
property (other than money) received.
Section 111 (a), id. § I 11 (a), provided the general formula for computation of gain that is
now found in the current provision, I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1976), i.e., gain = amount realized less
adjusted basis.
[Vol. 11:I1
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$23,767.03,51 the rough equivalent of her past depreciation deduc-
tions with respect to the property.52 This result initially appears jus-
tifiable on a tax-benefit theory. 3 This theory, however, presents cer-
tain difficulties, given the particular facts of the case.
2. The Particular Facts.-Although the record does not state
the date on which Mrs. Crane's deceased husband acquired the
apartment building, the taxpayer's petition to the Tax Court does
indicate that the mortgage was made in 1924." Mr. Crane died in
193211 during the early years of the depression. It seems fair to infer
that the property had declined significantly in value from the date
Mr. Crane acquired the property until his death in 1932.56 Indeed,
but for Mr. Crane's untimely death, the 1938 disposition of the
apartment building might have produced a taxable loss.5 7
Mrs. Crane inherited the apartment building at a time when the
outstanding mortgage was in default for nonpayment of principal
and interest.58 Since she was unable financially to cure the default,
51. Ordinary gain of $24,031.45, less 50% of her capital loss of $528.85. 331 U.S. at 5.
52. The actual depreciation claimed was $25,500. Id. at 3 n.2. The allowable deprecia-
tion was computed as $28,045.10. Id. at 4; see supra note 48. The further discrepancy between
allowable depreciation and taxable gain stems from the fact that $7,042.50 of accumulated
interest was included in the basis for depreciation purposes, but was not included as part of the
amount realized. See supra notes 37, 46 and accompanying text.
53. It seems equitable that a taxpayer who takes depreciation deductions on the basis of
a borrowed capital contribution should be required to include those deductions in taxable in-
come if he or she is in some way relieved from paying back the borrowed capital.
54. There were two mortgages involved; one was made in 1923, the other in 1924, and
the two were consolidated on February 8, 1924. Record at 5-6.
55. 331 U.S. at 3.
56. Indeed, the property was originally listed in Mr. Crane's estate tax return at a value
less than the outstanding mortgage. Upon review, the Commissioner adjusted the value
upwards and the taxpayer accepted the adjustment. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5. Evidencing
the likely decline in the property's value is the significant number of depression era tax cases
involving property whose value declined to less than 50% of its value at the time of acquisition.
Most of these cases involve the issue of whether disposition of the property results in ordinary
or capital loss. See, e.g., Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1939) (property
acquired in 1927 for $105,000; value in 1932 no more than $38,000); O'Keefe v. Commis-
sioner, 44 B.T.A. 290 (1941) (property acquired in 1928 for $50,750; value in 1937 approxi-
mately $9,000); Hoffman v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 459 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 117 F.2d
987 (2d Cir. 1941) (property acquired in 1928 for $160,000; value in 1934, S65,000).
57. If we assume that Mr. Crane's basis in the building in 1923 was 50% greater than
its value at his death in 1932, see supra note 56, he would have had a basis for depreciation of
approximately $310,000. Using the agreed upon depreciation rate of two percent per annum,
he would have been entitled to approximately $93,000 in depreciation deductions between
1923 and 1938. Thus, his adjusted basis at the time of disposition in 1938 would have been
$217,000. Since the amount realized with respect to the building was only $203,028.25, Mr.
Crane would have recognized a taxable loss on the sale of approximately $14,000.
58. See Record at 16 (Stipulation of Fact (11)).
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she entered into an agreement with the mortgagee whereby she
would turn over monthly rental payments, net of operating expenses,
to the mortgagee, to be applied to property taxes and interest due.59
Apparently, these net rentals were insufficient to cover interest pay-
ments as they accrued. Thus, in 1934, upon an additional payment
of $2,500 by Mrs. Crane, the mortgagee agreed to reduce the rate of
interest on the outstanding debt to four percent.6 0
Despite this reduction, Mrs. Crane's payments were insufficient
to cover the interest as it accrued.61 In 1938, under threat of foreclo-
sure, Mrs. Crane negotiated a sale of the property to a third party.62
Upon closing, she received $2,500 net in cash.63 The record does not
indicate what arrangements were made between the new owner of
the property and the mortgagee for the future liquidation of the out-
standing mortgage debt.
Although tax consequences do not necessarily follow cash flow,
it is important for a full understanding of Mrs. Crane's position to
review the above facts from a cash flow perspective. First, no cash
was available to her from rentals on the property as it was all turned
over to the mortgagee. Nor did the turning over of these net rentals
create any indirect economic benefit to Mrs. Crane. It did not, for
example, discharge any personal liability attributable to her." Sec-
ond, she obtained no economic benefit through use of the property
since it was being used by the tenants.65 Had she never assumed
ownership of the property, her net economic position would have
been the same."6 In fact, she paid $2,500 of her own funds in an
attempt to keep the property67 and upon final disposition she
recouped that $2,500. 8 Thus, absent tax considerations, she had no
economic gain.69
59. Id. at 19-25.
60. Id. at 25-26.
61. See 331 U.S. at 3.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The payments were used to take care of property taxes for which Mrs. Crane was
not personally liable. Any residue was credited towards past due interest. Record at 19-25.
65. Had the property been available for Mrs. Crane's personal use as, for example, a
residence, then arguably the consumption value stemming from such use would have been an
economic benefit.
66. Of course, by assuming ownership she acquired a potential economic benefit hinging
on the property's future increase in value. The property's value presumably did increase, since
Mrs. Crane was paid $2,500 for her equity in 1938. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. See supra text accompanying note 60.
68. 331 U.S. at 4.
69. It is more likely that she suffered some degree of economic loss. For example, if the
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Before an accurate conclusion regarding Mrs. Crane's true eco-
nomic gain can be reached, however, the tax effects of the described
events must be considered. For example, if Mrs. Crane's payment of
$2,500 in 1934 was a payment of interest properly deductible for tax
purposes in that year, then the $2,500 receipt in 1938 must be con-
sidered a taxable recoupment of that expenditure. In that case, the
$2,500 receipt must be treated as an economic gain in 1938 and re-
ported as gross income at that time.70
In addition, as the true owner of the building, Mrs. Crane theo-
retically was entitled to the gross rents.7 1 As such, she would have
had an initial taxable economic benefit equal to the amount of the
gross rents. However, since all of the gross rentals were expended in
the same year they were received, and were expended on items prop-
erly deducted for income tax purposes, there was no net economic
benefit and no taxable income.
There is, however, one remaining tax consideration which is in-
dependent of annual cash flow: depreciation. In some contexts, de-
preciation is merely a means of accounting for a prior cash expendi-
ture.7 2 In other contexts, it has nothing to do with a prior cash
expenditure.7 3 In the case of mortgaged property, depreciation de-
legal fees attributable to her ownership of the property were statisfied out of her own funds,
rather than income produced from the property, the net result would be an economic loss.
70. See I.R.C. § 451 (1976).
71. It could be argued that, in substance, Mrs. Crane was merely acting as the mortga-
gee's agent in collecting the rents; that pursuant to her initial agreement with the mortgage
bank, she was never entitled to any of the rents, but was bound to turn them over directly to
the bank for the purpose of discharging someone else's obligation. Since this agreement was to
stay in effect until such time as her deceased husband's obligation was no longer in default,
perhaps she should not have been considered the owner of the property for tax purposes until
such time as she was relieved from the agreement. Although this characterization of the situa-
tion was not specifically argued by Mrs. Crane during the litigation, it is implied in her argu-
ment that she never really owned anything other than the equity in the property. See infra
note 97 and accompanying text.
72. For example, if Mrs. Crane had purchased the property for $262,000 cash in 1932,
she would have accounted for the expenditure tax-wise through subsequent depreciation
deductions.
73. For example, if Mrs. Crane had inherited the property free and clear of any liens in
1932 when it was worth $262,000, she still would have been entitled to the same depreciation
deductions discussed earlier, see supra note 72, even though she had made no cash expenditure
whatsoever. Although it is true that her husband probably made some cash expenditure in the
past, it might have been more or less than the amount of depreciation deductions Mrs. Crane
would be entitled to take after his death. This anomaly results from the basis rule contained in
§ 1014 and the failure of our tax system to restrict depreciation deductions to actual capital
investment by the taxpayer. The result can be attacked or defended using various tax policy
arguments. At any rate, the rule with respect to inherited property has been part of our tax
system from its beginning and, thus, is presumably here to stay. But see Friend v. Commis-
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ductions often give a taxpayer advance credit for subsequent cash
expenditures. 4
As the record indicates, Mrs. Crane utilized the standard depre-
ciation rules during the years 1932 through 1938.75 She claimed ap-
proximately $3,500 a year in depreciation deductions for a total of
$25,200 over the seven year period involved. 8 In effect, she was
given tax deductions for cash expenditures she had not yet made.7
Surprisingly, the record indicates something further: Mrs. Crane re-
ceived virtually no tax benefit from these depreciation deductions be-
cause there was insufficient income against which the deductions
could be offset.78  During the seven year period, approximately
$3,000 of the claimed depreciation actually served to reduce taxable
sioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941). Friend involved a lease having a premium value to the
lessor because it provided for rentals in excess of the going market rate. Upon the death of the
original lessor, the beneficiary asserted that the premium value determined at the date of death
constituted a basis upon which depreciation could be calculated since the lease was a wasting
asset. The court said the step-up at death provisions were meant to give heirs a basis for gain
or loss upon disposition only and were not intended to create a depreciable cost basis where
none had existed previously. Id. at 961. But see Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th
Cir. 1953).
74. This is especially true under the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System which al-
lows a taxpayer to write off a building's cost over 15 years, even though it may be subject to a
30 or 40 year mortgage. I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1982). See also Mayerson v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966) (99 year mortgage term); supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 46.
76. Id. The Commissioner, however, asserted she was entitled to claim somewhat higher
depreciation deductions. See supra note 47.
77. Of course, strictly speaking she was not being given credit for the nonrecourse debt
in advance of its payment in the same manner as a taxpayer who acquires property through
purchase with nonrecourse funds. Her basis was determined as the fair market value of the
property unreduced by the mortgage debt. She was, however, being given an advance credit
indirectly because the net value of the property she inherited was zero. Disregarding the mort-
gage liability has the same effect as including it in basis.
78. Record at 6-7. In only three of the seven years at issue would the elimination of the
depreciation deduction have produced any tax liability. Thus:
Year Income Eliminating Depreciation Tax
1932 (estate) 3,438.61 92.26
1933 (estate) 1,569.76 22.79
1937 (Mrs. Crane) 1,294.41 6.60
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B. The Issues Presented
The Supreme Court phrased the issue in Crane8 ° as follows:
"The question here is how a taxpayer who acquires depreciable pro-
perty subject to an unassumed mortgage, holds it for a period, and
finally sells it still so encumbered, must compute her taxable gain." 81
This general statement of the issue necessarily involves a num-
ber of specific subsidiary issues relevant to the computation of gain.
These subsidiary issues include: (1) What was the "property" ac-
quired by Mrs. Crane in 1932 and sold in 1938? (2) What was her
original basis in the property? (3) Must that basis be adjusted for
depreciation in order to determine the adjusted basis figure to be
used in the computation of gain formula? 2  (4) What was the
amount realized in 1938?
Additionally, if the Court adopted the Commissioner's computa-
tion of Mrs. Crane's gain, it would have to address the constitutional
argument raised by the taxpayer. This argument was that to tax her
on the statutorily computed gain would violate the Constitution by
taxing her on something other than income as that term is used in
the sixteenth amendment.83
79.







Although the absence of tax benefit was not included in the list of stipulated facts at the
trial level, the relevant tax returns for the past years were introduced into evidence and the
fact was never disputed. The absence of tax benefit was pointed out at least seven times in the
briefs filed with the Supreme Court. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Brief in Support
Thereof at 4, 6; Brief for Petitioner at 3, 6, 46; Brief for the Respondent at 8; Petitioner's
Reply Brief at 4.
80. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Gain = Amount Realized less Adjusted Basis. I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1976). Whether or
not this is the correct formula to be used in a nonrecourse mortgage transaction can be consid-
ered a subsidiary issue. The Court, however, never considered another alternative and, thus,
implicitly resolved this issue at the outset.
83. Specifically, the taxpayer argued that since the tax which the Commissioner sought
to impose was not really on income, but instead was on capital, it would violate the provisions
of article I of the Constitution which requires such a tax to be apportioned among the States,
see U.S. CONsT. art. I. Brief for the Petitioner at 50.
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C. The Court's Holding
The Court's ultimate holding regarding computation of gain
was that the existence of the nonrecourse liability did not affect any
of the elements in the statutory formula for calculation of gain."
Thus, original basis was not affected by the existence of the liability.
The availability of depreciation deductions and the concomitant ad-
justments to basis were not affected. Finally, amount realized was
held to include the debt to the same extent it would have been in-
cluded had Mrs. Crane been personally liable.85 Thus, the Court
held that Mrs. Crane had statutory income to the extent the cash
boot and outstanding debt exceeded her adjusted basis in the
property. 86
The Court further held that the resulting statutory income was
constitutional income and thus satisfied the requirements of the six-
teenth amendment.87 The fact that Mrs. Crane's income resulted
from depreciation deductions that gave her virtually no tax benefit
was not addressed directly by the Court. Nonetheless, the Court's
holding on the constitutional issue implies that absence of tax benefit
should not affect statutory calculation of gain, nor does it affect Con-
gress' power to tax that gain.
D. The Court's Rationale
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate its rationale in Crane
has created much speculation about what its primary rationale actu-
ally was. 88 It has also generated much discussion about what the ra-
tionale should have been.89 This article will now focus on the former,
i.e., on what the Crane Court itself most likely considered as the
main justification for its holding.
1. Primary Rationale for Principle Number One: Inclusion of
84. See 331 U.S. at 13.
85. See id. at 14.
86. See Id.
87. See Id. at 15-16.
88. See, e.g, Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Case, 33 TAX. L.
REv. 277 (1978); Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of
Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing. 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Newman, The
Resurgence of Footnote 37: Tufts v. Commissioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1982).
89. Commentators have accepted the Crane result as correct. Dissatisfied with the
Court's explanation of the result, however, they have developed their own theories for explain-
ing its correctness in Crane as well as in other cases involving nonrecourse debt. See, e.g.,
Friedland, Tufts and Millar: Two New Views of the Crane Case and Its Famous Footnote, 57
NOTRE DAME LAW. 510 (1982); Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Amount Realized: The De-
mise of Crane's Footnote 37, 59 OR. L. REV. 3 (1980).
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Nonrecourse Liability in Depreciable Basis.-As noted earlier, the
Crane Court did not hold that nonrecourse debt, in and of itself,
created depreciable basis. Tax basis, both for depreciation purposes
and for purposes of determining gain upon disposition, is statutorily
defined.90 In Mrs. Crane's case, the applicable statute provided for a
tax basis in inherited property equal to the property's fair market
value at death.91 The specific holding in Crane was that the existence
of nonrecourse mortgage liability with respect to inherited property
did not affect the normal application of the section 1014 basis rule.9 2
Nonetheless, the Crane principle regarding basis was readily applied
to cases involving cost basis under section 101293 because it was per-
ceived that "the rationale of the opinion is equally applicable to
property acquired by purchase or exchange." 94
The Crane rationale respecting depreciable basis can be identi-
fied best by focusing on the issue as it was presented to the Supreme
Court by the contestants. The Commissioner argued that Mrs.
Crane had inherited property consisting of land and a building, that
basis is determined by the fair market value of the property on the
date of inheritance, 95 and that the existence of any mortgage, nonre-
course or otherwise, had no bearing on the basis issue.96 Mrs. Crane,
on the other hand, argued that she inherited a mere equity of re-
demption whose value was zero because of the mortgage liability.97
If one focuses on Mrs. Crane's legal rights with respect to the
property at the time of her husband's death, the logic of her argu-
ment is evident. The mortgage was in default at Mr. Crane's
death.98 Mrs. Crane, as his beneficiary, could acquire ownership
rights in the property only by paying off the debt, and since the debt
was equal to the property's value, the equitable rights she possessed
were worth nothing.
90. See I.R.C. §§ 1011-1016 (1976 & West Supp. 1982) (basis rules).
91. See supra note 48.
92. See 331 U.S. at 11.
93. See Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. 1969-2 C.B. xxiv; Black-
stone Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 801 (1949), acq. 1949-2 C.B. 1; Parker v. Dela-
ney, 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950). The use of cost basis is granted by statute. I.R.C. § 1012
(1976).
94. Greenbaum, The Basis Of Property Shall Be The Cost Of Such Property: How Is
Cost Defined?, 3 TAx L. REv. 351, 355 (1948).
95. 331 U.S. at 7 (relying on I.R.C. § 113 (1938) (current version at I.R.C. § 1014
(1976))).
96. See id. at 4.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id.
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Mrs. Crane asserted that the definition of "property" should be
derived from a legal analysis of the taxpayer's "bundle of rights"
with respect to the physical asset.9 9 The Court addressed the issue,
however, as one of statutory construction. Employing a plain mean-
ing approach, the Court concluded that property, for purposes of de-
termining basis, means a physical asset.' 00 The Court's opinion
would have been more satisfactory had it dealt directly with the tax-
payer's argument and admitted that her characterization of the
"property" she inherited was correct, but that nonetheless, for depre-
ciation purposes, the "property" in question was the physical asset.
The Court reasoned, quite correctly, however, that utilizing an
equity basis for depreciation purposes, was inconsistent with our de-
veloped scheme of accounting for depreciation and would create sig-
nificant administrative difficulties. 1'0 This line of reasoning, however,
lends only indirect support to the Court's stated principle that nonre-
course debt must be included in depreciable basis. That is, although
our depreciation scheme and concern with administrative difficulties
lead to a conclusion that an equity basis for depreciation purposes is
undesirable, they do not necessarily answer the ultimate question:
Should a taxpayer who owns property subject to a nonrecourse mort-
gage liability be entitled to depreciation deductions in excess of cash
investment?
Mrs. Crane argued that she was not entitled to depreciation de-
ductions, because she bore no risk of loss. 10 2 If the building declined
in value, it would have been the mortgagee bank, not Mrs. Crane,
who suffered the real economic loss. Since she did not invest her own
funds and since the net value of the property she inherited was zero,
she had nothing to lose by not paying this debt.0
Her argument appears sound as a matter of law. The right to
claim depreciation deductions on property does not necessarily ac-
crue to the holder of the legal title.20 Potential risk of loss is a nec-
99. Id. at 3, 6.
100. Id. at 6. The Court actually cited to Webster's Dictionary in support of the plain
meaning of the word "property." Id. at 6 n.14.
101. Id. at 10. The most obvious difficulty would be a recalculation of the depreciable
equity basis each year, with an increase warranted any time payments of mortgage principal
were made,
102. Id. at II.
103. See Id. at 3. Her situation is clearly different from that of a personally liable mort-
gagor who has invested no funds in property with an equity of zero. The personally liable
mortgagor will, nonetheless, bear the risk of loss if the property declines in value because the
mortgagee bank can recover any resulting deficiency from such an obligor.
104. See Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939) (lessee entitled to
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essary prerequisite to claiming the deduction. 10 Thus, since Mrs.
Crane bore no risk of loss at the time she inherited the property,
logically she should not have been entitled to depreciation
deductions.
The Supreme Court, however, regarded her "no risk of loss"
argument as one that essentially involved a question of fact. It stated
rather summarily that she had failed to establish factually that there
was no risk of loss and that the Tax Court, as finder of fact, had
failed to make any such finding.10 6 In focusing on the factual nature
of her argument, the Supreme Court failed to offer a satisfactory
rationale for the legal principle that the opinion set forth and which
has been followed since 1947:107 Nonrecourse mortgagors are enti-
tled to depreciation deductions computed on a basis which includes
the nonrecourse debt, even though, as a matter of property law, the
risk of loss does not fall on the mortgagor.
Although the Court refused to acknowledge that the principle it
implicitly set forth regarding depreciation deductions was an excep-
tion to the normal 'risk of loss'requirement, it did make a few obser-
vations that support a possible rationale for this exception. In dis-
cussing Mrs. Crane's failure to establish her factual premise, the
Court emphasized: (1) that there was no evidence that the property's
value ever fell below the outstanding mortgage debt,10 8 (2) that Mrs.
Crane's receipt of boot in 1938 suggested that the property had in-
stead risen in value,109 and (3) that a different rule might be appro-
priate in cases involving property worth less than the mortgage
debt. 10
These observations regarding the relationship between the prop-
erty's value and the debt suggest that principle number one of the
Crane case ought to be applied in limited fact situations.1 The
depreciation deduction). Lazarus was cited by the Crane Court. 331 U.S. at 11 n.32.
105. See Royal St. Louis, Inc. v. United States, 578 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1978) (depreci-
ation deduction denied owner-lessor in sale and leaseback situation because lease required
lessee make good any economic loss; thus, lessor bore no risk of economic loss).
106. 331 U.S. at 11. It could be argued, however, that the Tax Court implicitly made
such a finding as a matter of law since it accorded her a zero basis and held that the basis
should not be reduced by depreciation. See id. at 5.
107. Crane has only been modified slightly. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
108. 331 U.S. at 12.
109. Id.-
110. Id.
111. Indeed, application of the principle has been so limited in subsequent decisions.
See, e.g., Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976); Narver v. Com-
missioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), afd, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Court's earlier expression of concern with respect to administrative
difficulties, coupled with its emphasis on the property's fair market
value, lends support to the rationale I identify as the Uniform Treat-
ment Rationale, i.e., that nonrecourse mortgagors ought to be ac-
corded uniform tax treatment with personally liable mortgagors, pro-
vided such uniform treatment is warranted by the economic reality
of the situation. The relationship of the property's fair market value
to the outstanding debt is an indicator of the economic reality.
The suggested economic reality is that a mortgagor, whether
personally liable or not, will in fact pay off the mortgage debt to
protect his or her investment in a property whose value exceeds the
debt. Since it is the assumption of future payment which justifies
inclusion of mortgage in basis when the mortgagor is personally lia-
ble, if the facts support the same assumption in the case of a nonre-
course mortgagor, then he or she ought to be accorded like treat-
ment. Thus, although the Crane Court did not explicitly articulate a
rationale in support of principle number one, its indication that the
fair market value at the time of acquisition might affect its conclu-
sion regarding basis, 12 implicitly suggests the Uniform Treatment
Rationale.
2. Primary Rationale for Principle Number Two: Inclusion of
Nonrecourse Debt in Amount Realized.-Having rejected Mrs.
Crane's argument that what she inherited and sold was a mere
equity in the physical asset, the Court, as a matter of consistency,
had to reject her argument that she realized only $2,500 on the
sale. 1 3 Perhaps the need for consistency provides a sufficient expla-
nation for the establishment of principle number two. Both litigants
did argue that consistency at each end of the transaction was re-
quired.114 Therefore, once the Court sided with the Commissioner's
position regarding depreciable basis, consistency demanded that the
Court also side with the Commissioner by including the outstanding
mortgage in amount realized.11 5
The Court could have justified this part of its holding as being a
necessary corollary to the inclusion of outstanding mortgage debt in
basis. Indeed, the government specifically argued that including the
112. See 331 U.S. at 12.
113. See id. at 13.
114. See Brief for the Petitioner at 32; Brief for the Respondent at 7.
115. Indicative of the Court's concern with consistency is its observation that "[i]f the
'property' to be valued on the date of acquisition is the property free of liens, the 'property' to
be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing." 331 U.S. at 12 (footnote omitted).
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mortgage in the amount realized could be justified "solely on the
ground that it is a condition for permitting the taxpayer to include it
in basis. 116
The Court declined, however, to adopt the government's sug-
gested rationale, instead choosing a more complicated approach. It
attempted to explain why the nonassumption of a nonpersonal liabil-
ity constituted "money" or "other property" received by the seller,1"
thereby attempting to satisfy the statutory definition of amount real-
ized. -'18 Within the context of this explanation, the Court dropped its
famous footnote 37, suggesting that the mortgage would not re-
present an amount realized if it exceeded the property's fair market
value."' Had the Court opted for the rationale suggested by the gov-
ernment, presumably it would have established an absolute rule that
once the mortgage had been included in basis, it must also be in-
cluded in amount realized. Under this approach, the property's fair
market value at the time of disposition would have been considered
completely irrelevant. The Court's concern with fair market value,
therefore, appears to be an implicit rejection of the government's
suggested consistency rationale and the rationale's concomitant rule
regarding the inclusion of the debt in the amount realized when the
debt has been included in basis.
However strong the equitable arguments might be in support of
the absolute rule suggested by the government, the Crane Court
committed itself to a rationale which could explain how the transfer
of the nonrecourse liability might fit within the explicit statutory
definition of amount realized. In this respect, its approach was simi-
lar to that of the Board of Tax Appeals in Brons Hotels, Inc. v.
Commissioner. 20 The court in Brons Hotels was attracted to the
logic of the equitable principle that a recourse liability should be
included in amount realized upon disposition merely because it had
been included in the basis upon acquisition.' 2 1 Nonetheless, the
Board felt it inappropriate to adopt such a rule as a matter of equity
because the term "amount realized" had been specifically defined by
Congress. 22
116. Brief for the Respondent at 27.
117. See 331 U.S. at 13-14.
118. I.R.C. § 1001(b)(1976).
119. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
120. 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936). Brons Hotels is cited in the Crane opinion as relevant au-
thority. 331 U.S. at 13 nn.34 & 35.
121. See 34 B.T.A. at 379.
122. See id. at 381-82.
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Neither the Brons Hotels court nor the Crane Court considered
what the result in their respective cases might have been had they
been unable to fit the transfer of the mortgage liabilities within the
statutory definitions of amount realized. It should be pointed out,
however, that a failure to find that the transfer of the liability consti-
tuted an amount realized would not necessarily mean that the dispo-
sition of the property resulted in no taxable income to the trans-
feror. 123 Once this point is understood, footnote 37 begins to take on
new importance. The footnote merely indicates that if the value of
the property is less than the mortgage, and the mortgagor is not per-
sonally liable, then the full amount of the mortgage debt may not
represent true sales price, 124 i.e., actual consideration to be paid for
the property, a concept implicitly embodied in the statutory term
"amount realized." In this fact situation, "a different problem might
be encountered. 25 Indeed, I suggest that in this factual situation,
the difference might be production of ordinary income, rather than
capital gain.1 26
Thus, the reasoning of the Crane Court might be described as
follows: (1) Since the liability was properly included in depreciable
basis, consistency demands that it be considered in the computation
of gain upon disposition, and (2) if the transfer of the liability at
disposition can be viewed as "money" or "other property" received,
then the proper way to consider it in the gain computation process is
as an amount realized. The Court struggled, however, with the statu-
tory meaning of "money" or "other property" as part of the defini-
tion of amount realized.
The approach the Court adopted was to analogize Mrs. Crane's
situation with that of a seller who disposes of similar property sub-
123. Herein lies the fallacy of the arguments in cases such as Millar v. Commissioner,
577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978), and Tufts v. Commissioner, 651
F,2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982). Since the government lim-
ited itself to arguing that the liability constituted an amount realized, the taxpayer responded
with an argument based on footnote 37 in Crane, which suggests that the liability not be
included in the amount realized if the property's fair market value is less than the liability.
The transfer of the liability, however, might well trigger income to the transferor, under some
other theory, such as tax benefit. In this case, the income would not represent a § 1001 gain
from the sale of property, see I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976), and should not be entitled to preferen-
tial capital gains treatment. See Infra text accompanying notes 218-46. The government ap-
pears to have conceded the capital gains issue. See Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214. Thus,
the government's current position is also in conflict with my reading of Crane.
124. See 331 U.S. at 14 n.37. For full text of footnote 37, see supra note 13.
125. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
126. See supra note 123; infra notes 239-46.
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ject to a mortgage liability for which the seller is personally liable.127
The Court assumed, and Mrs. Crane conceded, that if she had been
personally liable, the transfer effectively would have relieved her of
personal liability and that the relief of liability would have been
properly characterized as an amount realized. 28 The Court
concluded:
[W]e think that a mortgagor, not personally liable on the debt,
who sells the property subject to the mortgage and for additional
consideration, realizes a benefit in the amount of the mortgage as
well as the boot. If a purchaser pays boot, it is immaterial as to our
problem whether the mortgagor is also to receive money from the
purchaser to discharge the mortgage prior to sale, or whether he is
merely to transfer subject to the mortgage. .... Or put in another
way, we are no more concerned with whether the mortgagor is,
strictly speaking, a debtor on the mortgage, than we are with
whether the benefit to him is, strictly speaking, a receipt of money
or property. We are rather concerned with the reality that an own-
er of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at which the
property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of the mort-
gage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he transfers
subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substan-
tial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal debt in
an equal amount had been assumed by another. 2
Although the Crane Court's analogy to a personally liable mort-
gagor is a logical approach and produces justifiable results, the as-
sertion that the benefit to the nonrecourse mortgagor upon disposi-
tion "is as real and substantial . . . as if a personal debt . . had
been assumed by another"130 is simply not true. There is a qualita-
127. See 331 U.S. at 13.
128. Id. In point of fact, the Supreme Court had never directly considered the issue of
whether or not the effective relief would have been an amount realized under the principles of
section 1001, I.R.C. § 1001(b)(1976). The Hendler case, United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S.
564 (1938), relied on by the Crane Court, 331 U.S. at 13 n.34, was not a § 1001 case and,
furthermore, it involved the assumption plus immediate payment of the liability. Hendler, 303
U.S. at 566. Payment of a liability had been held to be income under Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), but assumption absent payment is arguably a different
issue because the release to the seller is not immediate. Brons Hotels, 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936), is
directly on point regarding the treatment of assumption absent payment as a present economic
benefit , see id. at 381-82, but it is a § 1031 case, I.R.C. § 1031 (1976).
129. 331 U.S. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
130. Id. Commentators have stressed that this passage from Crane identifies an eco-
nomic benefit that is not really present. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 88, at 282. The Supreme
Court, however, recently quoted this passage from Crane with approval, suggesting that the
reality of the transaction was one in which the taxpayer "realized an economic benefit." Die-
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tive difference between X's agreement to pay a debt that otherwise I
will have to pay and X's agreement to pay a debt that I may choose
to disregard at any time I decide I no longer wish to keep the mort-
gaged property. 13
The conceptual difficulty with the Court's approach to the statu-
tory language lies in the statutory language itself. According to sec-
tion 1001, gain is to be measured by subtracting adjusted basis from
the seller's total receipts.132 This approach is not problematic so long
as the entire purchase price is being paid to the seller. s3 When,
however, part of the purchase price is being paid to the seller's mort-
gagee, the seller's receipt is necessarily an indirect one, even if the
seller is personally liable.
There has never been a statutory provision specifically applica-
ble to sales of mortgaged property; the only statutory provision that
appears relevant, therefore, is section 1001. Thus, it is necessary ei-
ther to characterize the purchaser's payments to the seller's mortga-
gee as "money" or "other property" received by the seller, or else
compute the gain under some judicially created formula. Although
the latter approach is possible, and has been suggested by some com-
mentators,3 the Crane Court felt constrained to identify the gain by
applying the specific statutory language. In doing so, it stretched the
ordinary meaning of "economic benefit," enabling it to find an indi-
rect receipt of "money" similar to the "economic benefit" that a per-
sonally liable mortgagor recognizes upon disposition of the mort-
gaged property.
On the one hand, if the seller is personally liable on the mort-
drich v. Commissioner, 102 S. Ct. 2414, 2418 (1982) (payment of gift tax by donee constitutes
amount realized to donor, creating taxable income to extent tax exceeds donor's basis in trans-
ferred property).
131. Professor Bittker analogizes relief from nonrecourse debt to "the relief one obtains
from local real property taxes by disposing of the property" in which the identifiable economic
benefit is the "value of the taxes that will not be paid in the future." He observes that no one
would suggest this is a real economic benefit to the transferor. Bittker, supra note 88, at 282.
132. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
133. If the purchase price is paid partly in present cash and partly in future cash, as
evidenced by the purchaser's note or other promise to pay, the receipt of present cash will be
treated as "money" and the promise of future cash will be treated as "other property," in-
cluded in the amount realized to the extent of its fair market value. See generally Cain, Taxa-
tion of Promises to Pay, 8 GA. L. REV. 125, 130-34 (1973). Of course, under the installment
method of reporting, the seller need not recognize gain until the future payments of cash are
actually received. I.R.C. § 453.
134. See infra text accompanying note 194; see Adams, Exploring the Outer Bounda-
ries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159, 168
(1966).
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gage and the purchaser pays off the mortgagee as part of the
purchase price, it is easy to identify the payment as a present eco-
nomic benefit to the seller whose liability is thereby discharged.135
The payment on the seller's behalf would be treated as a receipt of
money by the seller and thus would constitute an amount realized.
On the other hand, if the seller is personally liable on the mortgage
and the purchaser merely promises, either explicitly (by assuming)
or implicitly (by taking "subject to"), to pay off the mortgage in the
future, then it is more difficult to characterize the benefit as a cur-
rent indirect receipt of money."3 6
Nonetheless, it has long been standard practice to treat the as-
sumption of a mortgage as an indirect receipt of money by the
seller.137 In addition, there were specific regulations supporting that
practice with respect to installment sales of mortgaged realty.138
Furthermore, both established practice and the installment sales
regulations treated implicit assumptions (e.g., the purchaser takes
"subject to") in the same manner as actual assumptions. In a pre-
Crane Supreme Court opinion,'3 9 a taxpayer challenged the install-
ment sales regulations.1 40 The Court explained the practical neces-
sity for currently taxing the mortgage-in-excess-of-basis element of
135. Cf. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's pay-
ment of employee's tax liability constitutes income); United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564
(1938) (assumption and payment of corporate liabilities by third party should be treated as
direct payment of money to corporation and constitutes taxable boot to corporate obligor).
Although Hendler was cited in Crane for the proposition that assumption of the liability would
be sufficient to create an amount realized, 331 U.S. at 13 n.34, there is nothing in the Hendler
opinion to indicate that assumption, absent an immediate payment, would be sufficient. The
Hendler Court's emphasis was on the discharge that actually resulted from the assuming cor-
poration's payment of the debt. See supra note 128.
136. Conceptually, the promise to pay the debt in the future appears similar to a prom-
ise to pay the seller the balance of the purchase price in future installments and, thus, it seems
more appropriate to characterize the resulting economic benefit to the seller as other property.
See supra note 133. Since the debt is not actually discharged until paid and since the seller
remains secondarily liable until final discharge, mere assumption of the liability cannot create
the type of economic benefit identified by the Supreme Court in both Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), and United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564 (1938).
137. O.D. 409, 2 C.B. 77 (1920) (seller must treat purchaser's assumption of mortgage
as receipt of cash even though mortgagee refused to release seller from liability on debt). See
Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936).
138. Treas. Reg. 69, Article 44 (August 28, 1926). The same provision can now be
found in Treas. Reg. § 1.453-4(c) (1958), which essentially provides that the assumption of a
mortgage shall be treated as a payment in the year of sale to the extent it exceeds the prop-
erty's basis. This approach to mortgages, therefore, is similar to treating the entire mortgage
as an amount realized under § 1001.
139. Burnet v. S. & L. Bldg. Corp., 288 U.S. 406 (1933).
140. See id. at 412-13.
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gain, rather than spreading it over future periods as the purchaser
made the future mortgage payments.""' Although the opinion focuses
on installment sales gains, the practical considerations are the same
for a cash basis taxpayer computing gain under section 1001.142 In
both cases it is justifiable to treat the seller's liability as though it
had been discharged if the understanding is that the purchaser is to
discharge it in the future. Under section 1001, this constructive dis-
charge is treated appropriately as a receipt of money for purposes of
determining the amount realized.
If the Crane Court had engaged in the foregoing analysis, then
it might have found it easier to justify its view that a nonrecourse
mortgagor's position is analogous to that of the personally liable
mortgagor and, thus, that the tax consequences ought to be the
same. In other words, the economic benefit to the personally liable
mortgagor is not a real present benefit when the property is trans-
ferred subject to the mortgage. Nonetheless, the amount of the mort-
gage which the purchaser is going to pay in the future is a real part
of the sales price and thus should be treated as an amount realized
at the time of sale. Likewise, the nonrecourse mortgagor receives no
real present economic benefit at the time of disposition. If, however,
the mortgage liability is to be paid by the purchaser, it does consti-
tute a real part of the sales price and should be treated as an amount
realized.1 43
Finally, in both personal liability and nonrecourse situations, if
the fair market value of the property at the time of disposition is less
than the outstanding mortgage, full payment by the purchaser is un-
141. See id. at 414.
142. The installment seller had argued that it received no "payment" until the purchaser
actually made payments on the mortgage. See id. at 412. The cash basis seller computing gain
under § 1001 could make a parallel argument that he or she had received no payment consti-
tuting money for amount realized purposes until the future payments actually discharged the
seller's liability. One of the practical difficulties in either case is that once the property is
transferred and the purchaser takes over the mortgage payments, the seller is no longer in-
volved as a practical matter and has no knowledge of the actual payments made on the mort-
gage liability. Thus, it is easier to treat the transfer of the mortgage as a payment or receipt of
money in the year of sale.
143. Likewise, in Diedrich v. Commissioner, 102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982), the Supreme Court
identified the donee's assumption of the donor's gift tax liability as the sale price, thereby
constituting an amount realized under § 1001. The gift tax liability in Diedrich is similar to
the nonrecourse liability in Crane in that the liability would not have arisen, but for the do-
nor's decision to make a taxable transfer. Similarly, Mrs. Crane's liability resulted from her
decision to accept the benefit of the inherited property and, with it, the tax benefit of deprecia-
ble basis.
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likely 144 and it is questionable whether the mortgage liability ought
to be treated as an amount realized. 145 The Supreme Court seems to
have intuitively understood this problem and indicated its sense that
this situation might be different by including footnote 37 in its
opinion.
In conclusion, then, the Crane Court's reasoning with respect to
principle number two suggests a two-pronged approach. First, be-
cause the mortgage was included in depreciable basis, consistency
may well require that the unpaid balance be considered as part of
the sales price upon disposition.146 Second, the unpaid mortgage bal-
ance will, in fact, be considered part of the sales price, and thus an
amount realized, if the facts indicate that the purchaser intends to
pay off the mortgage. Footnote 37 suggests that if the fair market
value of the property is less than the mortgage, it cannot be assumed
that the purchaser will, in fact, pay off the mortgage.14 7 In this case,
the difference between the property's value and the debt should not
be characterized as an amount realized. How this difference ought to
be characterized is a question which the Crane Court did not have to
face because it assumed on the facts before it that the purchaser
would pay off the full amount of the outstanding mortgage. 14 8 The
144. With respect to a personally liable mortgagor, the difference between the property's
value and the outstanding debt has been characterized as discharge of indebtedness income
when the mortgagee agreed to cancel the entire debt upon disposition of the property and the
seller was insolvent. Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370 (1979). There is regulatory
authority for this approach under § 1001. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(c) example 8 (1980).
These regulations specifically deny the same type of treatment to a nonrecourse mortgagor,
thereby ignoring the impact of footnote 37 in Crane.
145. If a personally liable mortgagor transfers, the property subject to the mortgage and
the purchaser does not agree to pay off the mortgage debt unless the property's value increases
sufficiently to warrant payment, then the potential future payment appears too contingent to
justify full inclusion of the debt in the amount realized. See Corn Exch. Bank v. United States,
37 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1930) (accrual basis creditor need not recognize as income currently
accrued interest if there was sufficient doubt that debtor would pay interest in future). Suffi-
cient doubt as to the future ability of a seller/mortgagee to collect on a vendor note has been
held to prevent characterization of the note as an amount realized under § 111(b), current §
1001. George W. Potter, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 622 (1948). If the purchaser subsequently trans-
ferred the property subject to the vendor's lien note, it would seem logical that the tacit as-
sumption by the new purchaser to pay the original debt should not be treated as an amount
realized if future payment is still speculative.
146. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
147. Although it cannot be assumed that the mortgage will be paid in this situation,
other facts may indicate that it will be. For example, a purchaser may be willing to pay $1.8
million for property worth only $1.4 million, if the payments are to be made over a sufficiently
long period of time at relatively low interest rates. See infra note 245.
148. See 331 U.S. at 3 (Court states property sold "subject to the mortgage"); see also
id. at 12.
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proper characterization of this difference is a topic that will be dis-
cussed in Part IV of this article.
3. Rationale for the Court's Rejection of Mrs. Crane's Consti-
tutional Argument.--Since Mrs. Crane received no readily identifi-
able economic benefit from the property, she argued that the Com-
missioner's computation of gain according to the existing statutory
rules resulted in a taxable gain that did not constitute "income" as
that term is used in the sixteenth amendment.1 49 The Court re-
sponded by holding that income is something more than the "direct
receipt of cash."' 50 It also disagreed with her characterization of the
transaction as "a ruinous disaster."151 It was not "a ruinous disaster"
in the Court's view because she had been entitled to and had claimed
depreciation deductions during her seven year holding period.152 The
Court then concluded:
The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to
exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing
gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the taxpayer can
enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets. The
Sixteenth Amendment does not require that result any more than
does the Act itself.15 3
This passage from the Crane opinion was misunderstood by the
Fifth Circuit in Tufts.'" Other courts have focused on the "double
deduction" language as the key explanation for the result in Crane.
These subsequent cases, however, differed from Crane in that the
taxpayers in these cases actually received a tax benefit from the de-
ductions they claimed.15 5 Thus, the threat of double deductions in
149. Brief for the Petitioner at 50.
150. 331 U.S. at 15.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 15-16 (footnotes omitted).
154. Judge Thornberry, writing for the majority in the Tufts appellate decision, 651
F.2d at 1060 n.4, expressed the court's "uncertainty as to the exact nature of the 'double
deductions' that concerned the [Crane] Court," and assumed that the reference was an en-
dorsement of a portion of Judge Hand's opinion in Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F.2d 504, 505
(2d Cir. 1945), affid, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). He concluded that the court could not understand
why, if the property had depreciated, the taxpayer was required upon disposition "to somehow
'surrender' the previous deductions or the gain that he never realized." 651 F.2d 1060 n.4. Of
course, Mrs. Crane did realize a gain because it was assumed from the payment of boot that
her property had appreciated in value. The Fifth Circuit is on strong ground, however, by
identifying the "double deduction" passage from Crane as having nothing to do with the
amount realized. Instead, as will be shown, the passage is referring to the mandatory adjust-
ment to basis requirement. See Infra text accompanying notes 166-68.
155. See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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these cases was real and presented an additional justification for ap-
plying the statutory formula for computation of gain.
What is overlooked by the commentators and courts is that
there was no threat of a double deduction in Crane. The Crane
Court applied the statutory formula to compute a gain of approxi-
mately $24,000 on a transaction that had yielded Mrs. Crane only
$2,500 in cash and a $3,000 tax benefit, which resulted in a mere
$200 tax savings.15 The previously quoted passage regarding double
deductions more likely reflects the Crane Court's concern with the
potential for double deductions in other cases than its finding of an
actual double deduction in Mrs. Crane's case. Indeed, I suggest that
this portion of the Crane decision is merely a reaffirmation of an
earlier Supreme Court decision in which the Court had considered
the issue of when a taxpayer must recognize depreciation and what
effect depreciation ought to have on basis.
When the Crane Court stated that it had "already showed that
[if the taxpayer could exclude allowable deductions from considera-
tion in computing gain] the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction
• * * on the same loss of assets,"157 it was echoing its earlier opinion
in United States v. Ludey.1 58 The Ludey case involved a taxpayer
who had claimed depletion and depreciation deductions in an aggre-
gate amount less than the amount allowable.159 The issue was
whether the taxpayer was required to adjust his basis downward by
the full amount of allowable depreciation. If so, his sale of the prop-
erty would have resulted in a taxable gain, whereas he had claimed a
taxable loss on the transaction. There was no applicable statute dur-
ing the years in question which required such an adjustment.1 60 In
1046 (1978); Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 769 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
Mrs. Crane offset approximately $3,000 of otherwise taxable income by claiming depreci-
ation, thereby saving approximately $200 in taxes. See supra notes 78-79.
156. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
157. 331 U.S. at 16.
158. 274 U.S. 295 (1927). The Crane Court could not have been referring to any dem-
onstration of the potential enjoyment of a double deduction in the prior portion of its opinion
in Crane, because there is nothing in the prior portion of the opinion that makes any such
demonstration. Furthermore, the Crane quote regarding double deductions is lifted practically
word for word from a similar passage in Ludey. See infra text accompanying note 161. As
further support for the likelihood that the Court was referring to Ludey. see Brief for the
Respondent at 22-23, Crane. which states: "As this Court noted in [Ludey], unless the statute
is construed as requiring an adjustment of the basis on account of depreciation, the taxpayer
would get a double deduction for the loss of the same capital asset."
159. See 274 U.S. at 297.
160. The adjustment is now required by statute. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2)(B) (1976). The
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deciding the issue against the taxpayer, the Court stated:
The theory underlying this allowance for depreciation is that by
using up the plant, a gradual sale is made of it. The depreciation
charged is the measure of the cost of the part which has been sold.
When the plant is disposed of after years of use, the thing then sold
is not the whole thing originally acquired. The amount of the de-
preciation must be deducted from the original cost of the whole in
order to determine the cost of that disposed of in the final sale of
properties. Any other construction would permit a double deduc-
tion for the loss of the same capital assets.161
In other words, the Supreme Court viewed the depreciation of
the plant as an actual physical event which occurs with the passage
of time. The tax accounting rules have always required that the tax-
payer account for this phenomenon each year as the physical depre-
ciation occurs. 62 Waiting until the plant is sold at its depreciated
value and claiming the entire loss resulting from physical wear and
tear in that year is not allowed.10 3 This approach would put the loss
suffered in the wrong tax period. The mandatory adjustment to basis
on account of depreciation prevents the taxpayer from claiming the
loss in the year of disposition.
The Supreme Court stretched this point, however, when it con-
cluded that a failure to adjust basis on account of depreciation
"would permit a double deduction."' True, a double deduction
would result if the taxpayer had actually claimed a prior deprecia-
tion deduction and then subsequently claimed a loss in the year of
disposition because he or she had not reduced basis as required. In a
case such as Crane, however, if the taxpayer claims depreciation de-
ductions which result in no tax benefit, it is difficult to see how the
taxpayer "enjoyed" the first deduction and thus should not be per-
mitted to "enjoy" the same deduction at the time of disposition. 6 5
The real problem that Congress sought to correct by enacting
the mandatory adjustment to basis rules was not potential double
deductions, but instead the taxpayer's potential control over the tim-
first such statutory requirement was enacted in 1924. See 274 U.S. at 297 n.2.
161. 274 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
162. See I.R.C. § 167(b) (1976) (providing for methods of calculating "an annual al-
lowance"). But see Id. § 168 (1982) which creates a new accounting method for depreciation
by allowing accelerated deductions well in excess of actual physical depreciation.
163. See Id. § 167(b) (1976).
164. 274 U.S. at 301.
165. See supra text accompanying note 153 (Crane Court describes taxpayer as en-
joying a deduction).
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ing of depreciation losses for tax purposes. Specifically, Congress was
concerned that taxpayers would fail to claim depreciation losses in
low income years, and instead claim the loss in a later, high income
year.168 The mandatory downward adjustment to basis rules prevent
taxpayers from controlling the year in which depreciation will be
recognized.1 67
In order to grant adequate protection against taxpayer manipu-
lation, the rules were enacted as absolutes. The Supreme Court in
Ludey endorsed the absolute nature of these rules."68 Likewise, the
Crane Court held that no exception to these rules was warranted
even though Mrs. Crane received no prior tax benefit and was not
able to claim a subsequent loss, but instead was forced to report an
artificial gain. In so holding, the Court again endorsed the absolute
nature of these rules, ignoring the fact that Mrs. Crane's case did
not present the potential for taxpayer abuse that the rules were in-
tended to prevent.
It should be noted, in conclusion, that the resulting artificial
gain to Mrs. Crane was caused not only by the timing requirement
regarding recognition of depreciation loss, but also by the application
of another timing principle: Gain can only be recognized when it is
realized."6 9 Assume that Mrs. Crane's building was appreciating due
to market factors at the same time it was depreciating due to physi-
cal forces. The combination of the two timing principles would pre-
vent her from offsetting appreciation gain with depreciation loss.
Had she been able to make an offset, her net gain on the property
would have been $2,500 plus the $3,000 in depreciation deductions
which had been utilized to offset other income. Thus, it was the ap-
plication of tax accounting principles coupled with the fact that in-
come must be accounted for on a yearly basis170 which caused her
166. For a discussion of the legislative history on this point, see Lischer, Depreciation
Policy: Whither Thou Goest, 32 Sw. L.J. 545, 552-53 (1978).
167. For example, if the taxpayer elects not to recognize depreciation in year one, the
property's basis will nonetheless be reduced so that year one's depreciation cannot be recog-
nized in a later year.
168. See 274 U.S. at 300-01. The Supreme Court went even further in another pre-
Crane case, Virginian Hotel Corp. v. Helvering, 319 U.S. 523 (1943). The Court held that the
taxpayer was required to adjust basis downward by the amount of the claimed depreciation in
excess of the actual allowable depreciation, even though the excess resulted in no tax benefit.
See id. at 526-28. This result was subsequently reversed by Congress. See I.R.C. § 1016
(a)(2)(B) (1976).
169. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
170. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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fictitious gain problem."'
4. Crane Rationale: Conclusion.-Based on the foregoing anal-
ysis, it is my opinion that the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Crane suggests a rationale in which footnote 37 should not be dis-
missed as mere dictum. The Court's overriding concern with the
property's fair market value throughout the transaction is important.
First, the Court suggested that the property's fair market value at
the time of acquisition might have some bearing on principle number
one. 1 2 Subsequent courts correctly have followed this suggestion and
disallowed the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis when the prop-
erty's fair market value was less than the debt, thus transforming
what was dictum in Crane into law.
My analysis of Crane indicates that the dictum contained in
footnote 37 also merits legal status. Although Tufts17 3 does adopt
footnote 37 as law, it does so for the wrong reasons. Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit's holding is incorrect to the extent that it automati-
cally allows that portion of gain attributable to debt in excess of the
property's value to go untaxed. The court, however, is correct in ex-
pressing concern about the Crane decision in general .17 Its concern
stems from the fact that it interpreted Crane's reasoning regarding
the amount realized as being primarily based on a perceived eco-
nomic benefit at the time of disposition. 17 5 As the foregoing discus-
sion illustrates, the perceived economic benefit is not as real and sub-
stantial as the Crane Court purports.7
According to my analysis of the Crane Court's reasoning, the
presence of a real and substantial economic benefit at the time of
disposition is not necessary to justify inclusion of the mortgage debt
in the amount realized. The purchaser's payments, both present and
future, to the extent they are made to the seller or the seller's mort-
gagee, ought to be included in the amount realized. The future pay-
ments to the mortgagee ought to be treated as presently received by
171. This problem is not likely to arise under the current tax system because, although
the accounting principles are unchanged, the integrity of the taxable year has been eroded by
liberalization of the net operating loss carryover provisions. See I.R.C. § 172(b) (West Supp.
1982). The current carryover period under § 172 is 15 years. Id. § 172(b)(1)(B). In 1932, the
year Mrs. Crane acquired the property, the carryover was limited to one year.
172. See 331 U.S. at 12 (taxpayer did not prove "that the value of the property was ever
less than the amount of the lien").
173. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1982).
174. See Id. at 1063.
175. Id. at 1061-62.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
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the seller when the property is transferred, if the facts indicate that
payments are likely to be made.177 If the property declines in value,
as contemplated in footnote 37, the assurance of future payment in
full to the mortgagee is absent. Thus, the justification for including
the full debt in the amount realized, on the theory that its future
payment is a constructive present receipt, is also absent.
Despite the absence, however, of a constructive present receipt
that fits within the statutory definition of "amount realized," there
may be another type of constructive present receipt or economic ben-
efit derived from the transaction as a whole.17 8 In footnote 37 cases,
presence of this other receipt or benefit is a sufficient basis for taxing
the nonrecourse mortgagor upon disposition. Since Crane was not a
footnote 37 case, the Supreme Court did not have to develop a ra-
tionale to explain the appropriate result in such cases. The next two
parts of this article discuss potential rationales that do attempt to
explain the appropriate result in footnote 37 cases.
III. BEYOND Crane: IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE
This part of the article focuses on three alternative rationales
which have been offered by others as explanations for why nonre-
course debt ought to be included in amount realized. All of these
alternative rationales ignore the effect of the fair market value of the
property at time of disposition. Thus, after presenting a brief expla-
nation of the three rationales, I analyze the effect of their failure to
incorporate the fair market value limitation suggested by footnote
37.
A. The Economic Benefit Rationale
I agree with the Fifth Circuit in Tufts 179 that the Economic
Benefit Rationale, as developed in Crane,18 0 is an unsatisfactory ex-
planation of the amount realized issue.181 The root of my dissatisfac-
tion is that there simply was no real economic benefit at the time of
disposition, even though the Supreme Court attempted to demon-
177. This approach is necessary to avoid the administrative difficulties that would result
if the future payments were treated as receipts to the seller only when made by the purchaser.
See supra note 142.
178. Courts have failed to consider tax treatment differentiations and, thus, have re-
jected footnote 37 for the wrong reasons.
179. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1982).
180. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
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strate that there was. I am willing, however, to call the disposition of
the mortgage debt, along with the property, a constructive economic
benefit, only if the mortgage is included in basis and the facts at the
time of disposition support the conclusion that the debt, in fact, will
be paid by the transferee or fully satisfied in some other manner.
At least one commentator contributing to the Crane literature
has suggested that the Crane Court may have been correct in search-
ing for an economic benefit to justify its holding but that the Court
erred when it focused on the economic benefit at the time of disposi-
tion. 1 82 The commentator argues that, instead, the Court should have
focused on "the economic benefit the taxpayer receives from the en-
tire transaction, particularly the initial untaxed benefit of borrow-
ing." 183 The benefit of borrowing is initially untaxed because it is
assumed that the taxpayer will subsequently pay back the borrowed
funds. 8' The benefit can be identified either as the receipt of bor-
rowed cash or the receipt of property acquired with borrowed funds.
Under this theory, it is the economic benefit at the time of dis-
position, plus any prior identifiable economic benefit, that must be
included in the amount realized.1 85 The prior economic benefit must
be recognized upon disposition of the property because at that time
it is no longer assumed that the borrowed funds will be repaid and
thus the justification for allowing the benefit to go untaxed
disappears 186
According to this rationale, however, the property's fair market
value at the time of disposition is irrelevant. A decline in market
value would have no effect on the value of the prior economic bene-
fit. Thus, this rationale does not appear consistent with the Court's
inclusion of footnote 37 in its opinion.
There are other criticisms of this rationale. First, it presents
some minor conceptual difficulty. In cases involving a cash borrowing
against previously acquired property, the prior economic benefit is
easily identified. It is the receipt of cash, a benefit which is retained
upon subsequent disposition of the property. In cases involving the
acquisition of property with nonrecourse funds, the prior economic
benefit is less readily identified. The progenitor of this rationale sug-
182. Simmons, supra note 89, at 4-5.
183. Id. at 4.
184. See Woodsam Assocs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952);
Simmons, supra note 89, at 5.
185. Simmons, supra note 89, at 34, 41.
186. Id.
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gests that the prior benefit is the receipt of the property and that the
measure of the benefit is the property's value.187 Unlike the cash,
however, the property is not retained. Viewed at the time of disposi-
tion, the prior benefit is the use of the property from the time of
acquisition to the time of disposition. Specifically, from a tax view-
point, the benefit is the creation of a tax basis which has permitted
past depreciation deductions to be claimed that "permit tax-free re-
ceipt of other income." '188
At this point, a second difficulty arises. The emphasis on a prior
economic benefit, such as the tax-free receipt of otherwise taxable
income, suggests that if the prior depreciation deduction did not, in
fact, offset otherwise taxable income, as was the case in Crane, then
full inclusion of the debt in amount realized may not be justifiable.
In other words, the ability to claim depreciation deductions is not an
economic benefit unless the deductions produce tax savings. Thus, if
this rationale were applied to Mrs. Crane, the amount realized
would have been $5,500.189 Viewing the transaction as a whole, the
entire $5,500 should represent taxable gain. To arrive at this gain
under section 1001's formula,190 however, would require using a ba-
sis of zero. Since the statute specifically requires using the same ba-
sis for computing gain and depreciation, 91 use of a zero basis ap-
pears to be prohibited.
The Economic Benefit Rationale is alternatively explained by
the same author as a theory which identifies taxable gain by sub-
tracting the capital invested in the property from the capital recov-
ered from the property.1 92 Viewed in this light, Mrs. Crane recov-
ered $2,500 in cash and an additional $3,000 in depreciation. 93 The
remaining depreciation claimed by Mrs. Crane cannot be viewed as
a recovery of capital because it produced no benefit. Since she in-
vested no capital of her own, the full recovery of $5,500 is taxable
gain.
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id. at 18.
189. This figure is computed as follows: $2,500 cash received at disposition, plus $3,000
in deductions offset against $3,000 of otherwise taxable income. The full $3,000 should be
treated as an amount realized, rather than the $200 tax savings, because the depreciation
deduction is the equivalent of a $3,000 cash deduction which otherwise would have been neces-
sary to reduce taxable income to zero.
190. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1976); supra note 2.
191. See I.R.C. § 167(g).
192. Simmons, supra note 89, at 18.
193. See 331 U.S. at 3.
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Although this approach correctly identifies her taxable gain, it
does so by using a computation method other than that prescribed by
section 1001. Of course, in most cases the resulting gain will be the
same under either computational method. Nonetheless, for those
cases in which depreciation deductions have not produced full tax
benefit, only the "capital recovered minus capital invested"
formula ' 4 will work correctly. Section 1001's formula will work only
if the mortgage is excluded from basis. Although this latter ap-
proach may be theoretically sound, it is not supported by the statu-
tory language.1 95
B. The Tax Benefit Rationale
The Tax Benefit Rationale is essentially no different from the
Economic Benefit Rationale.196 In cases involving depreciable prop-
erty, the Tax Benefit Rationale would identify the taxpayer's prior
depreciation deductions as sufficient justification for including nonre-
course debt in the amount realized. In effect, the taxpayer "recap-
tures" the prior deduction when the property is transferred subject to
a mortgage that exceeds the adjusted basis of the property.
Like the Economic Benefit Rationale, the Tax Benefit Rationale
implies that if prior depreciation deductions produced no tax benefit,
the justification for including the full mortgage debt in the amount
realized is weakened. This is due to the fact that the rationale sug-
gests an application of the tax benefit rule.
The tax benefit rule requires that a taxpayer who recovers an
item which provided a prior deduction report the recovery in in-
come.19 7 Thus, if taxpayer A claims a bad debt deduction in year one
and in year five the debtor unexpectedly pays off the debt, then tax-
payer A has taxable income upon the payoff. In its current form, the
tax benefit rule would exclude any recovery if the prior deduction
resulted in no tax benefit.1 98
194. Simmons, supra note 89, at 18.
195. The real problem is that Congress has defined gains resulting from dispositions of
property in a manner that is difficult to apply to mortgaged property. Therefore, the courts
have had to stretch the plain meaning of the existing statutory language to include what is
clearly a gain on mortgaged property. The courts appear unwilling to endorse a judicially
created alternative to § 1001's formula, presumably because they view the existing statutory
scheme as one which preempts alternative approaches. It is this deference to Congress which
feeds the ongoing controversy concerning the meaning of the statutory term "amount
realized."
196. See supra text accompanying notes 179-95.
197. See articles cited Infra note 198.
198. Although the judicial and administrative development of the tax benefit rule did
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The rule is now codified in section 111 of the Internal Revenue
Code.199 Neither the statutory rule, nor the judicially created rule,
has ever been applied, directly or indirectly, to situations involving
depreciation deductions.200 As a general principle, it makes good
sense to exempt depreciation from the class of deductions that may
be recovered. Whereas bad debts which have been deducted may be
recovered when they are subsequently repaid,20 1 and deductible theft
losses may be recovered when the property is returned, 20 2 it is diffi-
cult to conceptualize an analogous recovery of a depreciation deduc-
tion. This is because physical depreciation is a fact that occurs with
the passage of time. Depreciation deductions account for this fact
and are allowed on the basis of a recognized accounting conven-
tion.203 When property is sold for a price in excess of its depreciated
basis, the sales proceeds do not represent a recovery of the physical
depreciation. Instead, they represent a payment attributable to an-
other fact: market appreciation.
Of course, to the extent that Congress has endorsed deprecia-
tion deductions that are not attributable to the fact of physical de-
preciation,2 04 the sales proceeds received upon disposition more
closely resemble, at least in part, a recovery of prior deductions.
Congress appears to have recognized this resemblance when it en-
acted the recapture provisions of sections 1245 and 1250.205
Whereas applying the tax benefit rule to tax the recovery of
prior deductions should result in ordinary income, using the rule as a
rationale for including nonrecourse debt in the amount realized
would not necessarily produce ordinary income. Instead, the gain re-
not consistently embrace this exclusionary portion, it has been a recognized aspect of the rule
since 1942 when the statutory forerunner of § 111, I.R.C. § 111 (1976) (originally enacted as
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13), was enacted. See Bittker &
Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265 (1978); Plumb, The Tax Benefit
Rule Today, 57 HARV. L. RPv. 129 (1943); Tye, The Tax Benefit Doctrine Reexamined, 3
TAx. L. Rav. 329 (1948).
199. I.R.C. § 111 (1976).
200. See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 198, at 278-79.
201. Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a)(1960).
202. I.R.C. § 165(e)(1976).
203. Id. § 168 (West Supp. 1982).
204. For example, the new Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) of the Internal
Revenue Code, id., seems to have less of a direct relationship to actual physical depreciation
since it allows an asset's cost to be written off over a period much shorter than its actual
physical life. See id. § 168(b) (fifteen year period).
205. Id. §§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & West Supp. 1982) (these provisions override the capital
gains provisions converting gain attributable to "recapture of depreciation" as ordinary
income).
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suiting from the disposition may be considered a gain resulting from
the sale or exchange of property, rather than from the recovery of a
prior deduction, and as such may be entitled to capital gains
treatment. o6
In summary, the Tax Benefit Rationale suggests that nonre-
course debt should be included in the amount realized if the debt has
provided the taxpayer with prior tax benefits. Usually the debt will
have provided sufficient benefits in the form of prior depreciation de-
ductions. There are several situations, however, in which this prior
benefit will be absent. First, if the mortgage debt is not included in
basis, no tax benefit, in the form of depreciation, attributable to the
mortgage, will occur.207 Second, no tax benefit will occur where the
taxpayer has insufficient income to be offset by the deductions. 208
In the former situation, there is no justification for including the
debt in the amount realized. In the latter, the justification also ap-
pears to be lacking because the analogy to the tax benefit rule sug-
gests noninclusion when the prior deduction produces no tax bene-
fit. 209 It can be argued, however, that the analogy is one which does
suggest inclusion of the mortgage in the amount realized, unless the
mortgage itself produces no tax benefit. If the mortgage is properly
included in basis initially, then it produces the benefit of tax basis at
that time, and the fact that the taxpayer subsequently fails to pro-
duce sufficient income to reap full enjoyment of the tax basis can be
considered irrelevant. This approach to tax benefit analysis is consis-
206, The ability to characterize the gain as one resulting from a sale or exchange may
be another reason the courts have preferred to compute gain under § 1001, rather than creat-
ing their own formula to compute the gain. See supra note 198. It is somewhat more difficult
to conceptualize the gain resulting from a "capital recovered minus capital invested" formula
as one'that results from a sale or exchange. The difficulty stems from the fact that recovery of
capital may occur bit by bit over the entire holding period of the property whereas the gain
from a sale or exchange connotes a receipt in the year of disposition.
207. A purchase money mortgage debt may not be included in basis either under § 465,
I.R.C. § 465 (1976), or under the rule set forth in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544
F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976)(inclusion of debt in basis may not be allowed where property's fair
market value is less than nonrecourse debt). See also Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53
(1980), affid, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982).
A nonrecourse debt resulting from a present cash loan secured by previously acquired
property would also result in noninclusion of the mortgage debt in basis. The Tax Benefit
Rationale, however, is not necessary to justify inclusion of the debt in the amount realized
since the receipt of the loan proceeds is sufficiently identifiable as money received by the
taxpayer.
208. This possibility has been greatly reduced, however, by the extension of the Net
Operating Loss Carryover to 15 years. See I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1982); supra
note 171.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 196-98.
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tent with the result in Crane, where there was virtually no tax sav-
ings, and with the mandatory adjustment to basis requirement under
section 1016.210 Thus, if one considers initial basis as a tax benefit
because it creates the potential for future useful deductions, the Tax
Benefit Rationale could be used to justify full inclusion of the out-
standing mortgage in amount realized in all cases in which the mort-
gage had been included in basis. The Economic Benefit Rationale, on
the other hand, would support inclusion only if the debt had been
included in basis and had actually produced useful deductions.
C. The Double Deduction Rationale
It was demonstrated in Part II of this article that the Crane
Court's reference to double deductions was merely a reiteration of
the Court's earlier holding that basis must be reduced by allowable
depreciation despite the fact that the prior deductions yielded no tax
benefit.211 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit in Millar v. Commis-
sioner' 12 and the Tax Court in Tufts2 3 considered the Crane Court's
concern with double deductions as the primary rationale for the
Court's holding on the amount realized issue. 4 Both courts readily
rejected the taxpayers' footnote 37 arguments because they con-
cluded that limiting the amount realized to the property's fair mar-
ket value would, in each case, give the taxpayers a double deduction
benefit.21 5
The benefit in Millar and Tufts was the claiming of deductions
in excess of invested after-tax capital. Strictly speaking, this benefit
is not the same as that which a taxpayer would derive from failure to
reduce basis by allowable depreciation upon disposition. It is, how-
ever, a benefit that is equally unwarranted.
Presumably, current deductions in excess of invested capital are
warranted on the assumption that future capital will be invested. If
the capital has not been invested by the time of final disposition of
the property, then it becomes necessary to create a constructive in-
vestment of the requisite capital. Treating the mortgage debt bal-
ance as an amount realized accomplishes a constructive investment
210. This section requires that an adjustment to basis shall be made. I.R.C. §
1016(a)(1976).
211. United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927). See supra note 158.
212. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978).
213. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
214. See 577 F.2d at 215; 70 T.C. at 769. For a discussion of these two opinions and
their purported use of the double deduction issue, see Newman, supra note 88, at 17-19.
215. 577 F.2d at 215; 70 T.C. at 770.
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of the requisite after-tax capital. The result is the same as if the
taxpayer had received the full sales price in cash, thereby triggering
gain; and then paid off the mortgage debt in cash, thereby investing
the requisite after-tax capital.
The Crane Court reasoned that the threat of double deductions
was a sufficient justification for the mandatory adjustment to basis
requirement. 2"1 The adjustment remained mandatory even in cases,
such as Crane, in which the first deduction produced no tax bene-
fit.217 Similarly, the threat of deductions in excess of invested capital
may be considered sufficient justification for a mandatory inclusion
of mortgage debt in the amount realized. Thus, the Double Deduc-
tion Rationale, more clearly than the Economic Benefit and Tax
Benefit Rationales, presents a coherent theory for including the debt
in the amount realized, in the absence of either economic or tax ben-
efit. This rationale suffers, however, from the same deficiency as the
other rationales in that it fails to consider the effect of an actual
decline in the mortgaged property's value.
D. The Effect of a Decline in the Mortgaged Property's Value
The three rationales discussed in this section of the article have
been offered by courts and commentators as a justification for princi-
ple number two in Crane: inclusion of nonrecourse debt in the
amount realized. In Part II of this article, I attempted to demon-
strate that the actual reasoning of the Crane Court-as suggested by
footnote 37-would not support full inclusion of the debt if the fair
market value of the property had declined below the outstanding
debt. Although these rationales serve the function of correctly identi-
fying the amount of taxable income that is recognized upon the final
transfer of property, each incorrectly treats the nonrecourse debt as
an amount realized and categorically considers the resulting income
as a section 1001 disposition of property gain. This is beyond the
congressional intent of section 1001.
If gain is computed under section 1001, and it results from a
disposition which can be characterized as a sale or exchange of a
capital asset, the gain will be taxed as capital gain,2"8 subject to re-
capture. 21 9 Alternatively, the gain may be accorded capital gains
treatment under section 1231, likewise subject to the recapture
216. See 331 U.S. at 15-16.
217. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
218. I.R.C. § 1221 (1976).
219. Id. §§ 1245, 1250 (1976 & West Supp. 1982)(recapture provisions).
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provisions. 20
Consider the effect of this approach in Tufts. The original basis
of over $1.8 million had been adjusted downward, due to deprecia-
tion deductions of almost $400,000.221 By the time of disposition, the
property had actually declined in value more than the total of prior
depreciation deductions.222 Inclusion of the unpaid $1.8 million
mortgage debt in the amount realized resulted in a section 1231 gain
of just under $400,000.223 The section 1250 recapture rule applied,
taxing as ordinary income only the amount of depreciation in excess
of straight line depreciation. Thus, out of a total gain of almost
$400,000, only $47,099 was characterized as ordinary income.224
This result seems inappropriate. Since the property had actually
declined in value, no market appreciation was present to support
capital gains treatment. Section 1250's partial recapture rule was
meant to reflect the fact that, if property is sold for a gain, a portion
of the sales proceeds received upon disposition is "attributable to a
rise in price levels generally rather than to an absence of a decline in
the value of the property.' ' 225 Thus, it is appropriate to tax this por-
tion of the gain as a capital gain because "[t]he portion representing
the rise in value is comparable to other forms of gains which quite
generally are treated as capital gains." 226 When the gain is attribu-
table solely to the fact that the taxpayer has taken depreciation de-
ductions on a basis which includes a nonrecourse debt, on which no
payments have been made, and there is in fact no rise in value, then
the conceptual justification for characterizing part of the gain as a
capital gain is not present.
Of course, it is possible to reach the desired result22 7 even if one
includes the full amount of the debt in the amount realized. Under
this approach, one would first identify debt in excess of basis as the
total gain computed under the section 1001 formula.228 At this point,
characterization of the gain would be determined by asking whether
220. Id.
221. 651 F.2d at 1059.
222. Id.
223. See 70 T.C. at 762.
224. See id.
225. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1673, 1807; H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03 (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1411.
226. Id.
227. The desired result is to tax the "debt in excess of value" gain as ordinary income.
228. See supra note 2.
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the gain resulted from a "sale or exchange."
The judicial response to the sale or exchange issue has been in-
consistent and confusing.229 The courts have placed unwarranted em-
phasis on the meaning of the terms "sale" and "exchange" in order
to resolve the ultimate issue of characterization.230 A more satisfac-
tory and direct approach would be to consider the transaction as a
whole and determine the character of the resulting gain or loss by
asking whether capital treatment is in accord with the statutory pur-
pose of the capital gain and loss provisions. 2a1 Because a substantial
body of case law focuses on the meaning of sale or exchange,2 2 how-
ever, this analysis should be considered in the context of a footnote
37 case, such as Tufts.
The issue that has arisen most frequently is whether a deed in
lieu of foreclosure constitutes a sale or exchange for purposes of de-
termining whether the resulting loss to the nonrecourse mortgagor
229. For a discussion of the inconsistent and confusing history of the judicial response,
see Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970, 975 (1980).
230. See, e.g., Stokes v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1941); Jamison v. Com-
missioner, 8 T.C. 173 (1947), acq. 1947-1 C.B. 2 (voluntary deed to state to avoid payment of
property taxes not a sale); Lapsley v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1105 (1941) (no sale or ex-
change upon nonrecourse mortgagor's reconveyance to seller/mortgagee); Baird v. Commis-
sioner, 42 B.T.A. 970 (1940); Commonwealth, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 850 (1937).
See also cases cited supra note 56. On the issue of characterization of gain, see Hudson v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 734 (1953), aff'd sub nom. Ogilvie v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 748
(6th Cir. 1954), holding that collection of a judgment debt by an assignee for value does not
constitute a sale or exchange. See id. at 736. But see I.R.C. § 1232 (1976 & West Supp.
1982) (granting sale or exchange treatment to certain collections on corporate notes at
maturity).
231. This approach is admittedly easier in the case of a gain, especially if the gain re-
sults in a bunching of income in one tax period due to several years of unrealized appreciation.
One of the many articulated statutory purposes for preferential capital gains treatment has
always been to mitigate the bunching effect. See Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc.,
364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960). With respect to losses, the approach is more difficult because there
is no concomitant statutory purpose in the capital loss limitation. For example, if nondeprecia-
ble property is declining in value steadily over a number of years, but the taxpayer is not
allowed to recognize the loss until final disposition, there appears to be no independent justifi-
cation for further penalizing the taxpayer by limiting the recognized loss to a partially deducti-
ble long term capital loss. The only satisfactory justification for the limited deductibility of
capital losses is that since the taxpayer has control over the timing of recognition of both gains
and losses, then the gains and losses ought to be netted, and losses ought to be carried forward
to prevent manipulation by the taxpayer. The manipulation which the special treatment of
capital losses seeks to avoid is the conversion of all gains into long term gains and of all losses
into short term losses, recognized in different tax years. For a discussion of the relevant legisla-
tive history, see Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 507-10 (1941). If a taxpayer, however,
has one single capital investment that ultimately results in a loss, the characterization as a
long term capital loss results in limited deductibility which is difficult to justify.
232. See cases cited supra note 230.
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should be characterized as ordinary or capital. There are a signifi-
cant number of pre-Crane cases holding that the transaction is not a
sale or exchange, but rather, an abandonment, and thus ordinary
loss is appropriate. 238 The apparent rationale for this holding is that
the transferor receives no consideration upon transfer and, absent
consideration, there can be no sale or exchange.'"
The Tax Court, in Freeland v. Commissioner,"- however, has
recently reversed its position on this issue, citing Crane as relevant
authority. The Court stated: "We believe the holdings of Crane...
mandate the conclusion that relief from indebtedness, even though
there is no personal liability, is sufficient to support a sale or
exchange."2 36
The taxpayer in Freeland countered by arguing that even if
Crane did lend support to the finding of a sale or exchange in trans-
fers by nonrecourse mortgagors, footnote 37 should, nonetheless, be
read as creating an exception. 23 7 The Tax Court responded by stat-
ing that "even if the amount realized was limited to the fair market
value of the property, that would involve only the amount of gain or
loss, not whether there was consideration to support a sale. 2 8
This response by the Tax Court is in direct conflict with my
reading of footnote 37. The footnote should not be read as a limita-
tion on the amount of gain. It should only be read as suggesting
exactly what the taxpayer in Freeland argued: If the nonrecourse
debt exceeds the property's value, then relief from the debt should
not be viewed as consideration for the transfer. Thus, to that extent,
it should not be considered an amount realized.
I have equated "amount realized" with "consideration for the
transfer" on the theory that the Crane Court contemplated this
equation when it wrote footnote 37. Alternatively, based on the tax-
payer's argument in Freeland,39 one might argue that the debt is
included in the amount realized, but that footnote 37 should be read
233. See cases cited supra note 230.
234. See cases cited supra note 230.
235. 74 T.C. 970 (1980).
236. Id. at 981.
237. The taxpayer in Freeland had invested $9,188 of his own money in the purchase of
land, giving a nonrecourse note in the amount of $41,000 for the balance. The property's value
subsequently declined to $27,000. Thus, the footnote 37 fact situation was present, albeit in a
loss, rather than a gain, transaction. The only issue was whether the $9,138 loss should be
characterized as capital or ordinary.
238. 74 T.C. at 982.
239. See supra text accompanying note 237.
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as an implicit recognition by the Court that relief from the debt does
not constitute "sale or exchange" consideration, except to the extent
of the property's fair market value.
Both approaches would produce the same result in Tufts. My
approach, as opposed to the Freeland approach, is to exclude the
debt in excess of value from the amount realized, thus removing that
amount of gain from section 1001, and thereby removing the impli-
cation that it is a sale or exchange gain.240 Absent a sale or ex-
change, there can be no resulting capital gain.24'
Finally, there is one further argument that can be made in sup-
port of my position that the excess gain242 does not warrant capital
gains treatment. This argument is based on an expansion of the Ar-
rowsmith rule.243 Loosely, Arrowsmith stands for the proposition
that it is appropriate to consider the tax effect of prior events in
order to determine the correct tax treatment of current events.244
240. A "sale or exchange" is considered a subclass of the more inclusive class of all
dispositions of property. Thus, absent a "disposition of property" gain, there could be no "sale
or exchange" gain.
241. Although I interpret the Crane Court's line of reasoning with respect to footnote 37
as supporting the ultimate conclusion that "debt in excess of value" gain should not be charac-
terized as a capital gain, it should be pointed out that capital gains characterization could not
have been considered by the Crane Court.
Crane dealt with depreciable property which was sold in 1938. The characterization of
gain rules applicable at that time always would have produced ordinary income upon disposi-
tion. This is because even a sale or exchange of depreciable property resulted in ordinary
income. See supra note 46 (paragraph 6).
It should also be pointed out that my interpretation of footnote 37 supports no sale or
exchange in dispositions that produce gain, such as in Tufts. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that there is no sale or exchange in dispositions that produce loss, such as in Free-
land. Using my amount realized approach in Freeland would suggest that there was considera-
tion for the transfer to the extent of the property's fair market value, i.e., $27,000. See supra
note 237. Basis, at the time of disposition, should include the $9,188 actual cash investment,
see supra note 237, plus only that amount of the nonrecourse liability supported by the prop-
erty's vajue, i.e., $27,000. See cases cited supra note 9. The resulting loss of $9,188 can then
be correctly computed under § 1001 as a disposition of property loss. Whether the disposition
should be characterized as a sale or exchange is unresolved under this analysis and, as I have
suggested earlier, see supra text accompanying note 231, is an inquiry which begs the ultimate
question: Should the loss be limited by the capital loss provisions?
242. The excess gain is attributable to the amount of debt in excess of the property's
value.
243. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). This case held that the character-
ization of a current loss deduction as ordinary was prohibited by the fact that the present loss
was integrally related to a prior capital gains transaction. See id. at 8-9. To my knowledge, the
Arrowsmith rule has never been used to convert what appears to be a current capital gain into
ordinary income because of its relationship to prior ordinary deductions. To do so would thus
require an expansion of the rule beyond its current application.
244, See id.
[Vol. 11:1
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 44 1982-1983
FROM CRANE TO TUFTS
The current event in Tufts is a taxable gain. To the extent the gain
is attributable solely to prior depreciation deductions, which in retro-
spect should not have been allowed because the necessary cash in-
vestment to support the deductions will never be made,4 5 the Arrow-
smith rule could be applied to characterize the current gain as
ordinary income. Because of the recognized integrity of the taxable
year, the prior depreciation deductions should be allowed to stand if,
in the year claimed, the available facts indicated that the debt would
be paid, either by the taxpayer or by a subsequent purchaser. When
the property's value subsequently declines below the mortgage
amount, however, the justification for the prior deductions disap-
pears. At the time of disposition, the deductions should be recap-
tured as ordinary income. This recapture is different from recapture
under sections 1245 and 1250, which merely reconciles allowable tax
depreciation with actual depreciation in value. Here, the recapture
results from a prior inclusion of an amount in depreciable basis
which, in hindsight, should not have been included.
In conclusion, the decline in the property's fair market value
should be viewed as a fact which is directly related to the issue of
capital gains treatment. The legislative history of the capital gains
provisions and of section 1250 suggest that preferential treatment is
warranted if appreciated property is transferred.2 46 The sale or ex-
change requirement for capital gains treatment implicitly suggests a
transaction in which the transferor is cashing out on past apprecia-
tion by receiving consideration therefor. Finally, the Arrowsmith
rule lends indirect support for denying capital gains treatment to
that portion of the gain attributable to debt in excess of value.
The three rationales discussed in this section of the article do
245. This assumes that the necessary cash investment will not be made by either the
taxpayer or the purchaser in Tufts, because the established fair market value is insufficient to
suggest that full payment will be made. Of course, the purchaser may in fact be willing to
make full payment because the mortgage payment terms may be so favorable, e.g., a low
interest rate, that the payment of $1.8 million over time under such terms is equivalent to a
payment in cash of $1.4 million, the established value of the property. If this is the case, the
taxpayers should be entitled to treat the entire gain as § 1001 gain, a portion of which can be
reported as capital gains under § 1231.
Of course, if this is the case, then the Commissioner should have argued before the Tax
Court that the property's value, subject to such an attractive financing package, was in fact
$1.8 million, rather than the $1.4 million asserted by the taxpayers. Apparently, no such argu-
ment was made.
246. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1673, 1805; H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted
in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1313, 1409, 1573.
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not consider the capital gains versus ordinary income issue. Nor do
they offer any analytical tools for resolving the issue. In the follow-
ing section, a final rationale will be developed which can serve as an
analytical tool for addressing and resolving the characterization of
income issue.
IV. THE UNIFORM TREATMENT RATIONALE
In Part II of this article, I argued that the Crane247 Court's
reasoning with respect to principle number one suggested an under-
lying rationale which I have called the Uniform Treatment Ration-
ale.2148 It should be noted that this rationale does not explain why
any purchase money mortgage should be included in basis. Nor does
it assume that such inclusion is correct as a matter of tax theory.
Rather, it merely recognizes the existence of an established rule: A
personally liable mortgagor must include a bona fide purchase
money debt in the depreciable basis.249
Given this rule, the issue becomes whether the absence of per-
sonal liability creates a sufficient distinction to justify applying a dif-
ferent rule to nonrecourse mortgagors. The Crane Court decided it
did not. Presumably, the absence of personal liability does not, by
itself, suggest that the mortgage debt will not be paid. Since the per-
s6nally liable mortgagor is allowed to include the debt in basis on the
assumption that it will be paid in the future, there is no reason to
treat nonrecourse mortgagors any differently provided the facts indi-
cate that they also will pay their debts.
The likelihood of future payment is indicated by facts other
than the existence of personal liability. In cases decided subsequent
to Crane, courts have considered the fair market value of the prop-
erty to be the most relevant fact2 50 because if the fair market value
exceeds the liability, then the taxpayer is likely to pay off the lower
liability in order to keep the more valuable property.2 51 Indeed, in
one case,25 2 market value merely equaled the liability, yet was found
247. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
249. 331 U.S. at 13.
250. See, e.g., Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973). See also cases cited supra
note I11.
251, See Gans, supra note 9, at 96-104 (describing the "Likelihood-of-Payment" test).
252, Bolger v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760, 770 (1973). Of course, this also was the case
in Crane, i.e., that fair market value equaled debt. The Crane case, however, did not involve §
1012 basis, I.R.C. § 1012 (1976), which presumes an eventual cash investment in the property.
Thus, the likelihood of payment at the time of acquisition was not the Crane Court's main
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sufficient to support the "likelihood-of-payment" test.253
Uniform treatment of the two types of mortgagors can be
viewed as furthering two goals of tax policy:25' horizontal equity "55
and practicality.258 The goal of horizontal equity is furthered by tax-
ing similarly situated taxpayers in the same manner. The two mort-
gagors are similarly situated to the extent the facts suggest that the
mortgage at the time of acquisition will be repaid. The goal of prac-
ticality is furthered because it is more convenient, from an adminis-
trative point of view, to compute allowable depreciation deductions
on the full advance credit basis of the nonrecourse mortgaged prop-
erty than to make annual adjustments to basis which reflect the ac-
tual cash invested. 57 In addition, uniform treatment for depreciation
purposes relieves the Commissioner from the administrative burden
of determining which mortgages are truly with full recourse and
which are not.58
Similarly, the Uniform Treatment Rationale may be used to ex-
plain the tax consequences to a nonrecourse mortgagor upon the
final disposition of the mortgaged property. If absence of personal
liability is considered an insufficient distinction for purposes of origi-
nal basis and availability of depreciation, 5 it likewise may be con-
focus.
253. See supra notes 251-52. The presumption that debt will be repaid where the value
of the property equals the debt makes little sense unless the property is likely to appreciate in
value or produce other future benefits. On the other hand, future appreciation and future bene-
fit are considerations that presumably affect current fair market value. The result in Bolger v.
Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973), may reflect the court's recognition that assignments of fair
market value are rarely certainties and, thus, a close enough equivalency between value and
the mortgage liability ought to be sufficient to satisfy the likelihood-of-payment test.
254. For an excellent discussion of tax policy goals, see Sneed, The Criteria of Federal
Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1965). But see Popkin, The Taxation of Borrow-
ing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 56 (1980) (questioning of equity and policy implications of allowing
depreciation deductions to be claimed on basis which includes nonrecourse debt; pointing out
that nonrecourse borrowers in such situations often fail to report income at time of disposition
even though debt exceeds basis, thereby ignoring Crane's principle number 2).
255. See Sneed, supra note 254, at 574-80.
256. See id. at 572-74.
257. The difficulties involved in computing depreciation on a basis that does not include
nonrecourse debt was a major concern in the Crane opinion. See 331 U.S. at 9-10.
258. See Bittker, supra note 88, at 282. Professor Bittker points out that the Crane
Court opted for uniform treatment and that the Court's action was justifiable for reasons simi-
lar to those I have suggested in the text. It should be noted, however, that transactions covered
by § 465 do require an administrative determination as to the existence of personal liability.
See I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & West Supp. 1982).
259. Presumably, it still is, outside of those transactions specifically covered by § 465.
I.R.C. § 465 (1976 & West Supp. 1982). Section 465 would still permit nonrecourse liabilities
to be included in basis for purposes of calculating the appropriate depreciation deduction. The
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sidered an insufficient distinction for purposes of treating the nonre-
course mortgagor differently from his or her personally liable
analogue at the time of final disposition.
Therefore, in those cases in which the mortgage debt would be
included in the amount realized if the mortgagor had been person-
ally liable, the nonrecourse debt likewise should be included. The
result would be to characterize the entire gain as one derived from
the disposition of property, and capital gains treatment should be
available to the nonrecourse mortgagor to the same extent such
treatment is available to a personally liable mortgagor. This was the
approach implicitly endorsed by the Crane Court.260
Not every personally liable mortgagor, however, is required to
include the full amount of the outstanding mortgage in the amount
realized upon final disposition. Consider the case of a hypothetical
taxpayer, A, who borrows money from Bank X to acquire a deprecia-
ble building. A is personally liable on the mortgage note. Several
years later, the building's value falls below the remaining balance on
the mortgage debt. Due to depreciation deductions claimed by A, the
building's adjusted basis is less than both the property's value and
the debt. As a result of the adverse economic conditions that led to
the property's decline in value, A is unable to continue making the
required mortgage payments. In this fact situation, the most likely
final disposition of the property will be a foreclosure sale or a deed to
the mortgagee bank in lieu of foreclosure. Upon disposition, it is un-
likely that the full amount of the mortgage will be included in the
amount realized, because it is unlikely that it will be paid or other-
wise satisfied in full.
Presumably, the foreclosure sale will bring a price equal to the
property's fair market value, thus satisfying A's debt to Bank X only
to the extent of the property's value. If Bank X pursues A for the
deficiency, A's payment of the debt will produce no tax conse-
quences.26 1 Thus, the final tax result to A will be a section 1001
gain 212 equal to the difference between the property's value and its
deduction, however, can only be claimed for tax purposes to the extent the taxpayer is "at
risk" and a taxpayer is not considered at risk with respect to nonrecourse purchase money
debt, except to the extent he or she has offered other assets as security for the debt. See id. §
465(b). The "at risk" rules are inapplicable to real property. See id. § 465(c)(3)(D).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
261. Payment of a debt is a neutral transaction for tax purposes. In addition, the debt
has already been accounted for by its inclusion in basis and the resulting depreciation deduc-
tions it thereby made available.
262. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1976) (formula for gain computation).
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adjusted basis.
On the other hand, Bank X may elect to cancel A's debt in full,
either upon foreclosure or upon acceptance of the deed in lieu of
foreclosure. In this case, A's disposition of the mortgaged property
and the concurrent cancellation of the debt produce two distinct tax
consequences. First, A has disposed of the property in a transaction
which triggers gain computed under section 1001. Second, to the ex-
tent that the property's value is insufficient to satisfy A's personal
obligation to the mortgagee, A's liability has been forgiven, produc-
ing discharge of indebtedness income to A.26
The gain, if any, under section 1001 should be computed by
subtracting the adjusted basis from the fair market value of the
property at the time of disposition. The character of this gain will
likely be determined under section 1231, subject to recapture under
either sections 1250 or 1245. Discharge of indebtedness income
should be computed by subtracting the fair market value of the
property from the outstanding balance on the debt. If A can qualify
for the relief provided under section 108,264 then recognition of this
income can be deferred.265 If A cannot qualify, then the discharge of
indebtedness income should be reported as ordinary income.
Now, assume the existence of A1, a nonrecourse mortgagor, who
is an exact analogue to A, but for the absence of personal liability on
the mortgage note. Since A, is not personally liable, Bank X has no
choice but to satisfy its outstanding debt in an amount equal to the
property's value and to forego the remaining debt. A1's situation is
thus similar, at the time of disposition, to the situation of taxpayer A
whose deficiency has been forgiven.
To grant A1 the same tax treatment as A in this situation would
give effect to Crane's footnote 37. It would not, however, relieve A1
263. In Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370 (1979), the Tax Court recognized that
a transfer of property to satisfy creditors to whom the insolvent taxpayer was personally liable
could involve two separate transactions. Thus, the taxpayer in Danenberg was required to rec-
ognize gain on the portion of the transaction that represented a disposition of property. Id. at
386. The other portion, representing discharge of indebtedness income, went untaxed because
the taxpayer qualified under the judicially created insolvency exception, see id. at 388-89,
which has been codified by § 108. I.R.C. § 108 (Supp. IV 1980). See infra notes 264-65.
264. I.R.C. § 108. This provision is available to taxpayers whose debts are discharged in
bankruptcy, to taxpayers who are insolvent, and to taxpayers whose discharge debt represents
"qualified business indebtedness." Id. § 108(a)(1).
265. Although § 108(a) excludes qualified discharge of indebtedness income from imme-
diate inclusion in gross income, subsections (b) and (c) require the taxpayer to reduce either
certain tax attributes or depreciable basis by the amount of the excluded income. Id. § 108(b),
(c). The effect of these provisions is to defer recognition of the income to future tax periods.
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from paying taxes on the gain reflected in the difference between the
property's value and the face amount of the debt. Instead, the differ-
ence would be characterized as discharge of indebtedness income
and should either be recognized as ordinary income in the year of
disposition or be temporarily excluded from income under section
108.
Commentators who have considered the possibility of treating
the difference between the debt balance and the fair market value of
the mortgaged property as discharge of indebtedness income have
quickly rejected the notion on the theory that no such income can
possibly exist absent personal liability.2"6 The Tax Court has also
rejected the notion on the same theory.267
The approach of the commentators and the Tax Court, however,
ignores the underlying policy of section 108268 and fails to consider
the transaction as a whole. It is an approach based on the United
States v. Kirby Lumber 69 definition of discharge of indebtedness in-
come. This definition states that such income can only arise when the
discharge frees assets that the creditor might otherwise reach to sat-
isfy the debt.2 ° Under this definition, it is true that A. recognized no
such income at the time the property was transferred to the mortga-
gee in lieu of foreclosure. The mortgagee, in making the loan nonre-
course, had agreed from the beginning that all other assets would be
266. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001:
The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and RelatedProblems of Basis, 26 BUFFALO L. REV.
219, 322-23 (1977); Javaras, Nonrecourse Debt iii Real Estate and Other Investments, 56
TAXES 801, 806-07 (1978); Simmons, supra note 89, at 37 n.177.
267. See Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979). Delman had been a
partner in a partnership that had acquired § 1245 property, I.R.C. § 1245 (1976 & West
Supp. 1982), with nonrecourse debt. See 73 T.C. at 19-22, 35. The partnership deeded the
property to its creditors at a time when its fair market value was less than the outstanding
debt. See Id. at 25. The taxpayer attempted to characterize the difference between the value
and the debt as discharge of indebtedness income. The taxpayer further asserted that the insol-
vency exception applied to exempt the income from taxation. See id. at 28, 31. The court held
that under United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), no discharge of indebted-
ness income could arise unless the debt cancellation served to increase the taxpayer's net worth
by freeing up other assets. 73 T.C. at 32. Since a nonrecourse mortgage affects only the asset
which stands as security, its disappearance from the taxpayer's balance sheet, together with
the asset's disappearance, produces no effect on net worth. Id. at 33. Although the Tax Court's
strict doctrinal approach to the issue can be criticized, the result in Delman is correct on other
grounds. The insolvency exception should have been available only to the extent that the part-
ners were insolvent. The taxpayer's argument, however, was based on the insolvency of the
partnership.
268. See Infra text accompanying notes 278-80.
269. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
270. See Id. at 3.
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free from liability. If one considers this aspect of the transaction, it
is possible, even within the Kirby Lumber definition, to conceptualize
discharge of indebtedness income, which results upon the final
"transfer" of nonrecourse debt.
In other words, in order to identify the requisite "freeing up" of
assets,27 1 one only needs to view the transaction from beginning to
end.2 The initial agreement by the lender to look only to the mort-
gaged property for satisfaction of the debt constitutes an initial free-
ing up of other assets. There is no debt discharge income at that
time because the mortgaged property appears sufficient to cover the
debt and thus the benefit of having other assets freed from the obli-
gation has no value. The value of the prior agreement should, how-
ever, be recognized for tax purposes if there is a subsequent decline
in the mortgaged property's value. When the mortgaged property de-
clines in value, and is thus insufficient to cover the debt, the benefit
of the prior freeing up can be viewed as producing a present benefit
that is equal in value to the difference between the debt and the
property's value. The amount of this difference represents the
amount in value of other assets that, absent the nonrecourse agree-
ment, could have been reached to satisfy the debt. Thus, under this
analysis the difference could be characterized as Kirby Lumber dis-
charge of indebtedness income. 73
With respect to A1, it has already been argued that the amount
realized ought to be limited to the property's fair market value inde-
pendent of the Uniform Treatment Rationale. 4 It has also been
271. A "freeing up" of assets is the key concept in the Kirby Lumber definition.
272. This process is similar to that used in the Economic Benefit Rationale to identify
prior economic benefits.
273. If personal liability were a prerequisite for discharge of indebtedness income, what
should be the result if a mortgagee elected to reduce the balance owed on a nonrecourse note
by $10,000? If the secured property had not declined in value, surely the $10,000 ought to
result in discharge of indebtedness income. Since the mortgagor is being allowed to retain the
property, it is the secured property itself which is being freed from the creditor's claim. Of
course, if the mortgagee is also the seller of the property, the $10,000 reduction will be treated
as a reduction in the original purchase price under § 108, thereby reducing the property's
basis. Otherwise, the reduction in basis could be accomplished under the provision in § 108
dealing with trade or business indebtedness. I.R.C. § 108(c). In recently issued Rev. Rul. 82-
202, 1982-48 I.R.B. 5, the Service indicated that prepayment of a nonrecourse mortgage liabil-
ity in exchange for a reduction in the amount of the liability produced Kirby Lumber income.
Section 108 relief was not available because the taxpayer was neither bankrupt nor insolvent,
and the liability was not qualified business indebtedness.
274. This is so on the basis of Crane's footnote 37 which focuses on the constructive
economic benefit to the seller of having the mortgage debt paid off by the purchaser in the
future. See supra text accompanying notes 237-45.
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demonstrated that such a limitation does not necessarily result in
nontaxation of the gain represented by the excess of the debt over
the value. 27 5 All three rationales discussed in Part III of this article
correctly identify this excess as taxable income. If the gain attributa-
ble to the excess is not included in the amount realized, then it
should not be viewed as resulting from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset. The logical conclusion is that the excess should be
treated as ordinary income.
The only purpose in the foregoing attempt to characterize the
excess as discharge of indebtedness income, rather than some other
type of income, is to justify taxing the nonrecourse mortgagor, A1, in
the same manner as the personally liable mortgagor, A. Under cur-
rent law there are two possible tax consequences to A. The amount
of the discharge will either be taxed as ordinary income or it will be
subject to the relief provisions of section 108.276
Since A, should be taxed on the excess of the debt over the
275. See supra text accompanying notes 237-45.
276. There are no cases involving personally liable mortgagors in A's situation who have
been required to report the difference between the debt and the property's value as ordinary
income. In the past, both the Commissioner and the courts have been willing to accept the
mortgagor's characterization of the transaction as a single disposition of property in which the
full amount of the mortgage debt is considered an amount realized. See Lutz & Schramm, 1
T.C. 682 (1943); Main Properties, Inc., 4 T.C. 364 (1944), acq. 1945 C.B. 5 (both cases imply
that either taxpayer had gain from exchange of property or no income from debt discharge due
to insolvency exception). As a practical matter, if the disposition is a deed in lieu of foreclo-
sure, accompanied by full cancellation of the debt, the property's fair market value may not be
established at the time of disposition. This is especially true if the mortgagee had initially sold
the property to the mortgagor on the installment basis. In this case, the fair market value is
irrelevant to both parties since the seller/mortgagee has not yet reported the full gain under §
453, I.R.C. § 453 (1976), and his recoupment of the property is taxed under § 1038 which
focuses on the cash received, id. § 1038 (1976), and not the fair market value of the property.
The courts, however, have not been consistent in their approach to taxpayers who have
deeded property to creditors in cancellation of outstanding debts. A number of early cases held
that the full amount of the cancellation resulted in Kirby Lumber income which did not have
to be recognized because the taxpayer was insolvent at the time of discharge. The insolvency
exception to Kirby Lumber was first adopted in Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36
B.TA. 289 (1937). For an application of the insolvency exception, see Dallas Transfer &
Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1934)(holding no income
under insolvency exception even though facts involved transfer of property whose value ex-
ceeded basis). Accord Main Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 364 (1944), acq. 1945
C.B. 5. The bifurcated approach, subsequently endorsed in Danenburg v. Commissioner, 73
T.C. 370 (1979), was not argued or considered in these cases. The Danenburg case presents
the most conceptually sound approach, i.e., bifurcating the foreclosure transaction into two
elements of gain. See Id. at 386-88. Although the result in that case was to give the taxpayer
the benefit of the insolvency exception with respect to the amount of discharge of indebtedness
gain, Id. at 389, the transaction should have been bifurcated even if the taxpayer had been
insolvent. The result would have been ordinary income in the amount of the discharge.
[Vol. 11:1
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 52 1982-1983
FROM CRANE TO TUFTS
property's value at ordinary rates,271 regardless of whether the excess
is characterized as discharge of indebtedness income, the only practi-
cal effect of such a characterization is to make section 108 deferral
available to A1. Thus, the underlying issue is not whether A1's trans-
action, viewed in its entirety, creates the type of income envisioned
in Kirby Lumber, i.e., a freeing-up of assets which thereby produces
income. Rather, the issue is whether A1 ought to be entitled to the
relief provisions of section 108 in order to defer recognition of the
portion of the gain reflected in the excess of the debt over the value
of the property. Thus, the focus should be on the statutory purpose
of section 108 and whether A,'s overall fact situation is one intended
to be covered by that provision. If it is, relief should be granted.
It should be pointed out that the Uniform Treatment Rationale
merely serves as a guide in this case. The theory of the rationale is
that if A and A, are sufficiently similarly situated, they should be
accorded uniform tax treatment. As an analytical tool, the rationale
should be used to identify the particular facts in A's situation that
enable him to utilize section 108. The next step is to determine
whether the same facts are present in A1's situation. If they are, then
granting A. relief under section 108 appears justified. The Uniform
Treatment Rationale serves merely as a guide because the primary
analysis requires an identification of the statutory purpose behind
section 108 and an independent conclusion as to what facts are suffi-
cient to support its application.
The policy underlying section 108 recognizes that discharge of
debt usually results in situations involving taxpayers who are suffer-
ing from economic setbacks that prevent them from meeting their
loan payments as they fall due . 78 Although the discharge effectively
produces current taxable income, section 108 is intended to relieve
the debtor from being "burdened with an immediate tax liability. '279
There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that bankrupt,
insolvent, or financially troubled debtors who are not personally lia-
ble should be so burdened.8 0
277. This portion of the gain should not be viewed as resulting from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset since there is no consideration to support a sale or exchange.
278. S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7017, 7025.
279. Id.
280. In the hearings on the changes to § 108 there is one reference to the fact that Kirby
Lumber does not apply to create discharge of indebtedness income in cases involving no per-
sonal liability. The reference was merely in an introductory statement contained in a document
prepared by the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America. See Written Comments on
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Given this policy behind section 108, characterizing A,'s trans-
fer of the nonrecourse debt as an event that results in a constructive
freeing-up of assets is an unsatisfactory approach to answering the
ultimate question.2 8 ' Thus, the potential similarities between A and
A, must be reviewed more closely.
The nonrecourse mortgagor's potential debt discharge actually
occurs at the beginning of the transaction, whereas the personally
liable mortgagor's discharge necessarily occurs at the conclusion of
the transaction. Thus, from the lender's point of view, the nonre-
course mortgagor's financial situation at the conclusion of the trans-
action is irrelevant. The lender has no choice but to accept the subse-
quent loss, having elected at the outset to look only to the property
for satisfaction of the debt. In the case of the personally liable mort-
gagor, however, the lender will only discharge the debt if the mort-
gagor's financial situation at the conclusion of the transaction war-
rants it.
Applying the analytical framework of the Uniform Treatment
Rationale, therefore, requires a comparison of A,'s financial situation
at the conclusion of the transaction with that of a personally liable
mortgagor whose deficiency is likely to be forgiven. The fact that in
both cases the fair market value of the property has declined below
the mortgage debt is, in my opinion, not a sufficient similarity, al-
though it does suggest financial difficulty. Evidence of the bank-
ruptcy or insolvency of the nonrecourse mortgagor, on the other
hand, would suggest that a valid comparison can be made between
A, and A. Other evidence of financial difficulty, short of bankruptcy
or insolvency, presents a more difficult case from a practical point of
view. Consider the problems of proving that had the taxpayer been
personally liable, the mortgagee bank would have forgiven the
amount of the debt in excess of the property's value or in excess of
the price it might bring at a foreclosure sale. The court would be
placed in the position of making a decision normally made by bank-
ers. Should banking officials, properly qualified as expert witnesses,
Certain Aspects of H.R. 5043 Before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the
Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1980). The statute itself defines
indebtedness broadly enough to include nonrecourse liabilities. See I.R.C. § 108(d)(1)(B). See
also Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-48 I.R.B. 5.
281. The Kirby Lumber reasoning which originated the "freeing up" concept was merely
a means of demonstrating that the taxpayer had taxable income. Whether the taxpayer should
be accorded relief from immediate taxation on this income is an entirely different issue which
should focus on independent factual considerations. See supra notes 266-73 and accompanying
text.
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be allowed to testify as to their opinion regarding the issue? My own
sense of the situation is that, absent evidence of bankruptcy or insol-
vency, the practical difficulties suggest that other evidence should be
severely limited. Perhaps bona fide forgiveness of other debts on
which the taxpayer is personally liable during the same time period
is evidence that ought to be considered. What evidence should be
considered relevant and what quantum of evidence should be consid-
ered sufficient to establish the taxpayer's right to use section 108 are
issues more appropriately resolved on a case by case basis.
Proof of financial difficulty sufficient to warrant the potential
application of section 108, however, is not dispositive of the matter.
Absent bankruptcy or insolvency, the taxpayer may claim section
108 relief only with respect to the discharge of "qualified business
indebtedness. 282 In the case of corporations, all debt is treated as
qualified.2 3 For an individual, however, the debt will qualify only if
it is "incurred or assumed . . . by [the] individual in connection
with property used in his trade or business. '2 "
In other contexts, it has been held that the trade or business of
a corporation will not be considered the trade or business of the indi-
vidual shareholder. 288 Given the generally recognized legal distinc-
tion between a corporation and its shareholders, it is fair to conclude
that nonrecourse debt incurred for the purpose of acquiring corpo-
rate stock should not be viewed as qualified business indebtedness of
the individual shareholder. Thus, the debt in Millar28 should fail to
qualify under section 108, because the borrowed funds were invested
in a corporation for use in its trade or business. 87
The potential availability of section 108 in a case such as
Tufts,28 8 however, presents a more difficult question, because the
nonrecourse debt was incurred at the partnership level.2 89 Section
108(d)(6) requires that the existence of qualified business indebted-
282. I.R.C. § 108(a)(1)(C).
283. Id. § 108(d)(4)(A)(i).
284. Id. § 108(d)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
285. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963) (business of corporation
viewed as separate from that of shareholder in determining whether shareholder's bad debt
deduction was result of nonbusiness debt); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 883, 884 (2d
Cir. 1957).
286. Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978).
287. Id. at 214.
288. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1982).
289. Id. at 1059.
1982]
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 55 1982-1983
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
ness be determined at the partner level.290 Unless the trade or busi-
ness of the partnership is attributable to the partners, section
108(d)(6) would seem to prevent a solvent partner from ever claim-
ing relief under section 108(a)(1)(C).2 91 Congress, however, presum-
ably intended for section 108(a)(1)(C) to be available to solvent
partners,292 and thus the focus on the individual's trade or business
in section 108(d)(4) must be irrelevant in the partnership context.
An argument could be made for allowing a solvent partner in
financial difficulty293 to claim section 108 relief upon "discharge" of
a nonrecourse debt which would otherwise trigger immediate taxable
income. 29 "4 The facts necessary to support such an argument are,
however, likely to be a rare occurrence. Indeed, in the limited part-
nership context, where nonrecourse financing is heavily utilized to
produce valuable tax benefits,295 section 108 relief should prove to be
290. I.R.C. § 108(d)(6). The existence of bankruptcy or insolvency must also be deter-
mined at the partner level. See id.
291. Id. § 108(a)(l)(C). Relief is available to solvent taxpayers only if the discharged
debt is a qualified business indebtedness. Although the debt may qualify at the partnership
level, § 108(d)(4)'s definition of qualified business indebtedness focuses on the trade or busi-
ness of the individual. If the debt is incurred by the partnership in connection with property
used in its trade or business, then it cannot simultaneously be viewed as incurred by the indi-
vidual partner in connection with property used in his trade or business, unless the partner-
ship's trade or business is also viewed as the partner's trade or business.
292. Congressional intent on this point can be inferred from the provisions contained in
§§ 108(c) and 1017(b)(3)(C). The former provision limits the potential exclusion for discharge
of qualified business indebtedness to amounts for which the taxpayer makes a corresponding
basis adjustment in depreciable property. See id. § 108(c). The latter provision creates a spe-
cial rule for partnership interests. It allows them to be treated as depreciable property by the
partner to the extent of the partner's proportionate interest in the depreciable property of the
partnership, provided there is a concurrent basis reduction in the property at the partnership
level. Id. § 1017(b). Thus, if a solvent general partnership with solvent partners had a full
recourse debt discharged, there should be no income for any of the partners, provided the
partnership reduced its basis in depreciable property by the amount of the discharge. The
partners' basis would be reduced proportionately by the amount of the discharge. See id §§
731, 752.
293. The test of financial difficulty ought to be applied at the partner level as are the
tests of bankruptcy and insolvency.
294. Note that reduction of a nonrecourse liability in the absence of a disposition of the
property which secures the debt should not result in immediate taxable income, unless the
reduction exceeds the remaining undepreciated basis. Instead, it should only result in an imme-
diate reduction in basis.
295. Use of nonrecourse debt in limited partnerships is essential for a successful tax
shelter, because limited partners are allowed to include a pro rata share of such debt in their
partnership basis. Since a partner can only deduct partnership losses to the extent of basis,
nonrecourse debt serves to create additional basis which supports early deductions in excess of
actual invested capital. The "at risk" provisions of § 465, I.R.C. § 465, prevent this result in
certain limited partnerships.
[Vol. 11:1
HeinOnline  -- 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 56 1982-1983
FROM CRANE TO TUFTS
generally unavailable to limited partners. Even if, as in Tufts, the
partnership's investment becomes worthless, it is unlikely to cause
either insolvency or severe financial difficulty to a limited partner,
who typically invests minimal capital in exchange for large tax de-
ductions in order to shelter high earnings or income from other
investments. 96
Thus, in cases involving limited partners and Subchapter S
shareholders who benefit from nonrecourse loans, application of the
Uniform Treatment Rationale in a footnote 37 fact situation is most
likely to produce an element of ordinary income to those taxpayers
who have claimed tax deductions in excess of their actual invest-
ment. In rare cases involving nonrecourse mortgators who are bank-
rupt, insolvent, or perhaps are otherwise in sufficient financial diffi-
culty, the rationale can be used to support relief under section 108.
V. CONCLUSION
Crane9 7 held that nonrecourse mortgage liabilities must be in-
cluded in basis for the purpose of computing depreciation deduc-
tions. The implicit theory for the holding is that if the nonrecourse
mortgagor can be presumed to pay off the liability in the future,
there is no reason for treating him or her any differently from the
personally liable mortgagor who, on the same theory, is given credit
for mortgage liabilities in tax basis prior to actual payments.
In addition, Crane held that any outstanding liability at the
time of final disposition of the property ought to be considered an
"amount realized" for purposes of computing gain under section
1001.28 In footnote 37, however, the Court suggested that the result
might be different if the fair market value of the property at the
time of disposition was less than the mortgage debt. Unfortunately,
the Commissioner, the courts, and the commentators have inter-
preted footnote 37 as an either-or proposition. That is, they have
concluded that either the full amount of the debt is included in the
296. Even if financial difficulty short of insolvency is present, an additional argument
can be made against making § 108 relief available to a limited partner in a situation such as
Tufts. The argument is that it may be acceptable to characterize qualified business indebted-
ness of the partnership as qualified business indebtedness of a partner who is liable on the
debt; it does not make sense, however, to do so in the case of partners who are shielded from
liability and who, as limited partners, are passive investors in much the same sense as share-
holders of a corporation.
297. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
298. See id. at 14; I.R.C. § 1001(a)(1976)(formula for gain computation).
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amount realized or the portion not so included escapes taxation.29
The three rationales discussed in Part III of this article reflect this
interpretation of footnote 37.
What has been consistently overlooked is that the amount real-
ized upon disposition can be limited to the property's fair market
value without resulting in the nontaxation of gain attributable to the
excess debt. The exclusion of the excess debt from the amount real-
ized merely removes this element of gain from the operation of sec-
tion 1001. The result is that this element of gain should not be con-
sidered as gain resulting from the disposition of the property.
Although the disposition triggers the gain, the gain itself is attribu-
table to something else. The gain is attributable to what may be
characterized as prior beneficial tax deductions in excess of invested
capital or a prior receipt of cash which will not be repaid. Or, the
gain may simply result from a judicially imposed rule: If nonre-
course mortgagors are treated the same as personally liable mortga-
gors at the beginning of the transaction, then equity demands that
they be treated the same at the conclusion. Under this latter ap-
proach, the nonrecourse mortgagor's final disposition of the property
should be viewed as relieving the mortgagor from payment of the
mortgage liability, thus creating a present economic benefit similar
to that experienced by personally liable mortgagors whose liability is
assumed, satisfied, or cancelled.
The most significant result of bifurcating total gain into section
1001 gain and this other gain is that the former may qualify for
capital gains treatment whereas the latter should result in ordinary
income. The policy behind preferential capital gains treatment sup-
ports this result because the property has not appreciated.
Whereas all three of the rationales discussed in Part III can be
used to identify the total realized gain in a footnote 37 case, they do
not indicate how this total gain should be taxed. Indeed, by treating
the entire gain as a section 1001 gain, the rationales implicitly sup-
port potential capital gains treatment. Although it is possible to in-
clude the full debt in the amount realized and then use the "sale or
exchange" requirement as a means of characterizing a portion of the
section 1001 gain as ordinary income, I prefer to avoid the artificial-
ity of the "sale or exchange" analysis. Limiting the amount realized
to the property's value is appealing because it is a more direct ap-
proach. Moreover, it gives the term "amount realized" a meaning
299. See supra note 14.
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which is more consistent with its context, i.e., as consideration of-
fered and accepted for the transfer of the property.
The Uniform Treatment Rationale, under which the amount re-
alized would be so limited, provides an answer to the characteriza-
tion question and adds one additional consideration with respect to
the deferred recognition of gain under section 108. As with the other
three rationales, the Uniform Treatment Rationale would treat the
entire amount of a nonrecourse debt in excess of the basis as realized
income upon the disposition of the property. It would do so in every
case.300 Its theoretical basis for doing so, however, is somewhat dif-
ferent than the others. According to the Uniform Treatment Ration-
ale, realized gain results because we have opted for a system that
ignores the absence of personal liability in appropriate cases involv-
ing nonrecourse mortgage transactions. Presumably, we have opted
for this system for reasons involving administrative considerations
and because the economic reality of certain nonrecourse transactions
is sufficiently similar to that of transactions involving personal
liability. 0 1
The Uniform Treatment Rationale merely recognizes that we
have adopted this system. It assumes that if the economic reality of
two different transactions, one involving nonrecourse debt and one
not, is sufficiently similar, then uniform tax treatment of each trans-
action is warranted.
Thus, capital gains treatment should be available to a nonre-
course mortgagor who disposes of property in a transaction having
an economic reality equivalent to a sale or exchange by a personally
liable mortgagor. If the fair market value of the property is less than
the debt, a personally liable mortgagor would not be able to sell or
exchange the property for the full amount of the debt. Nonetheless,
if the debt is cancelled, as it effectively is in every case involving a
nonrecourse mortgagor, the cancellation will trigger taxable income.
If the personally liable mortgagor must recognize the amount of the
excess debt as ordinary income, then so should the nonrecourse mort-
gagor. If the personally liable mortgagor is entitled to defer recogni-
300. The realized gain under the Uniform Treatment Rationale would not be affected
by whether prior deductions produced tax benefit since presence or absence of tax benefit is
irrelevant in the case of a personally liable mortgagor. See supra text accompanying notes 93,
104-07 (discussion of this issue with respect to the other rationales).
301. This system has been substantially abolished under § 465, I.R.C. § 465, which
preserves the administrative considerations regarding the computation of depreciation, but pro-
hibits recognition of depreciation for tax purposes unless the taxpayer has sufficient capital at
risk. See id.
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tion of that income under section 108 because he or she is bankrupt
or insolvent, then the bankrupt or insolvent nonrecourse mortgagor
should be entitled to the same relief. Whether the nonrecourse mort-
gagor ought to be accorded section 108 relief absent bankruptcy or
insolvency is a more difficult question. The Uniform Treatment Ra-
tionale suggests, however, that relief should be available if the nonre-
course mortgagor's financial situation is sufficiently similar to that of
a personally liable mortgagor, for whom such relief was intended.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Supreme Court should
give effect to Crane's footnote 37 in Tufts30 2 by holding that section
1001 gain should be limited to an amount equal to the property's
value less the adjusted basis. Since Tufts involves property whose
basis exceeds its value, no section 1001 gain would result. 303
Next, the Supreme Court should uphold the Commissioner's de-
termination of the taxpayers' realized gain, computed as the amount
by which the debt exceeds the adjusted basis. The gain should be
taxed as ordinary income because the mortgage debt should not be
considered an amount realized.304 Thus, the gain should not be con-
sidered as one which results from a sale or exchange of a capital
asset or from a section 1231 transaction. Characterization of the
gain as anything other than section 1231 gain is, however, an issue
that is not properly before the Court. It is an issue that can only be
judicially resolved if the Commissioner asserts such a position in a
future case.80 5
302. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
2034 (1982).
303. In the Tax Court, the taxpayers in Tufts asserted that application of footnote 37
should produce a taxable loss to the extent their basis exceeded the property's value. 70 T.C.
at 761. The Tax Court did not consider this argument since it found a taxable gain on the
transaction, and the issue was not raised on appeal. At any rate, it should be pointed out that
footnote 37 would never support a loss in a situation such as Tufts. Under the firs tprinciple of
Crane, basis should only include nonrecourse debt when it can be assumed that the debt will
be paid. Under the reasoning in Crane, once the property's value dips below the debt, the
assumption is no longer tenable. Thus, the taxpayers in Tufts should not be allowed to assert a
basis for loss purposes which includes a mortgage debt that they obviously will never pay.
304. Professor Wayne Barnett has filed an amicus brief with the Supreme Court in the
Tufts case in which he similarly concludes that the gain upon disposition should not be charac-
terized as a capital gain. This brief is well worth reading for his novel analysis of the issue. He
describes the gain in Tufts as a liability gain as opposed to an asset gain. As such, the gain is
similar to "income from the discharge of indebtedness," a type of income statutorily covered
by §§ 61(a)(12) and 108. His analysis, although different from my own, is consistent with the
approach I have taken and with my reading of the Crane decision.
305. In' order to assert this position, the Commissioner would have to withdraw Rev.
Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214, which currently lends support to treating the entire gain in a
footnote 37 case as one derived from a sale or exchange.
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Finally, section 108 relief should not be available to the taxpay-
ers in Tufts under the Uniform Treatment Rationale. Even if the
resulting income could be characterized as constructive discharge of
indebtedness income, the taxpayers do not appear to be otherwise
entitled to claim relief under section 108.306 The possibility of section
108 relief for other nonrecourse mortgagors, however, is an issue
that should remain open for consideration in an appropriate fact
situation.
306. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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